

JPRS-TAC-89-029  
19 JULY 1989



**FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE**

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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Arms Control**

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# Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-89-029

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**SOUTH AFRICA**

**Booster Rocket Launched at Overberg Test Range**  
*MB0207164089 Johannesburg Domestic Service*  
*in English 1600 GMT 5 Jul 89*

[Text] ARMSCOR [Armaments Corporation of South Africa] has announced the successful launching of a booster rocket at its Overberg test range in the Cape as part of a program to qualify the range. An ARMSCOR spokesman said that the launching was a major milestone in the development of the test range. The outgoing

chairman of ARMSCOR, Commandant Piet Marais, said that ARMSCOR had an important role to play in the establishment of technology that could contribute to the advancement of all the people of South Africa. He said that the Overberg range would strengthen South Africa's development and testing ability.

Commandant Marais praised the management team of the range for the way they were handling nature conservation. He said that they had refuted criticism made 5 years ago about the location of the range.

## NORTH KOREA

### Vice Foreign Minister on Proposal for Korean Nuclear-Free Zone

SK1207100089 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean  
0900 GMT 10 Jul 89

[Excerpts] On the morning of 10 July, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a news conference with domestic and foreign reporters at the People's Palace of Culture regarding the consistent foreign policy of independence, peace, and friendship implemented by the DPRK Government.

Reporters of newspapers, news agencies, and broadcasting stations in Pyongyang, foreign correspondents stationed in our country, and reporters who came to our country from many nations of the world to cover the festival, attended the news conference.

We will now report on the news conference.

[Begin recording by unidentified person] We will now begin the news conference. As the reporters from many nations of the world who are participating in the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students have raised various questions as to the foreign policy implemented by the DPRK, Chon In-chol, vice minister of foreign affairs, will speak on the foreign policy of independence, friendship, and peace implemented by the DPRK.

[Begin Chon In-chol recording] I am pleased to meet you. I also thank you for attending this news conference. I would like, first of all, to speak on the foreign policy of independence, friendship, and peace implemented by the DPRK.

The DPRK is an independent and peace-loving socialist country. The government of the Republic has consistently implemented a foreign policy of independence, friendship, and peace. Independence, peace, and friendship are the basic concepts maintained by the government of the Republic in its relations with other countries. [passage omitted]

That the government of our Republic implements a peace-loving foreign policy proceeds from the essential demand of socialism. Peace is an essential demand of socialism. The people of the entire world unanimously oppose war and hope for peace.

It is furthermore an urgent issue for our people, who are in direct confrontation with the U.S. imperialists and are under the constant threat of a nuclear war, to prevent war and safeguard peace. To prevent and safeguard peace, one should, first of all, tenaciously struggle against imperialism, which is the source of war. The government of the Republic is making every effort to check and frustrate the imperialists' policy of aggression and war, to maintain peace in Korea, and to defend peace in Asia and the world.

The important issue in preventing a war and safeguarding peace at present is to suspend the nuclear arms race, to realize arms reduction, to force foreign troops stationed in other countries and their military bases to withdraw, and to establish nuclear-free, peace zones in many areas of the world.

We are persistently struggling to force foreign troops of aggression and with nuclear weapons to withdraw from the Korean peninsula and other areas in Asia and to establish nuclear-free, peace zones in these areas. We are vigorously carrying out the antiwar and antinuclear peace movement in unity with peace-loving forces of the world.

The government of the Republic supports the constructive proposals of the socialist countries for relaxing international tensions, for suspending the arms race, and for realizing nuclear arms reduction, as well as their peace-loving efforts. It also supports the struggle of governments and peoples of many nations to establish nuclear-free peace zones in many areas of the world. [passage omitted]

Our party and the government of the Republic also in the future will thoroughly implement a foreign policy in which independence, peace, and friendship are its basic concepts. By doing so, it will guarantee Korea's peace and the great cause of independent and peaceful reunification, and contribute to establishing an equitable international order based on independence and defending world peace and security. I will end my speech. [end recording]

At the news conference there were answers given to the questions raised by foreign reporters.

Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a news conference with reporters regarding the consistent foreign policy of independence, peace, and friendship implemented by the DPRK Government.

### Ambassador to GDR on Korean Peninsula Peace Zone

AU0307200189 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND  
in German 29 Jun 89 p 6

[ADN report: "DPRK in Favor of Peace Zone in Korean Peninsula; Ambassador Pak Yong-chan Gave News Conference in Berlin"]

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The urgent necessity of transforming the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free peace zone was stressed by Pak Yong-chan, DPRK ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the GDR. At a press conference on the occasion of the month of solidarity with the Korean people's anti-imperialist struggle in Berlin on Wednesday [28 June], he pointed out that the United States has transformed South Korea into a nuclear-weapons base and has further increased its troops strength there. Large-scale military maneuvers

such as "Team Spirit" are an expression of this U.S. policy that aims at the continuation of tension. In this context, Pak Yong-chan recalled that the United States instigated the war against the Korean people 39 years ago. In contrast to this, the DPRK has made various efforts to reunify the country and to ensure peace and security in the region. However, so far there has not been a positive response to the proposal on trilateral negotiations between the DPRK, the United States, and South Korea. His country's proposals to transform the cease-fire agreement between the DPRK and the United States into a peace treaty, to gradually reduce the armed forces on both sides, and to stop large-scale military maneuvers have not been taken up so far.

Pak Yong-chan thanked the SED, the GDR Government, and the GDR's people for the solidarity shown to the DPRK and for the sincere help in preparing the 13th world festival of young people and students in Pyongyang.

### THAILAND

**Navy Declines Soviet Offer To Observe Exercise**  
*BK1107005089 Bangkok THE NATION in English*  
11 Jul 89 p 1

[By Phongsak Sisot]

[Text] The United States has asked members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other allies to turn down the Soviet Union's invitations to observe a naval exercise of the Soviet Pacific fleet northwest of Japan this week, diplomats said yesterday.

As a result, the Thai military called off a plan to send a team of observers led by Rear Adm Thanong Sirirangsi to the Soviet naval base in Vladivostok where the Soviet fleet is due to launch the exercise.

The other five ASEAN members have also turned down the invitation, the sources said.

The reasons behind the request remained unclear yesterday as spokesmen of the US embassy and officials of the Thai Foreign Ministry could not be reached for clarifications.

However, a well-informed source said Washington is concerned that its allies in Asia Pacific region would be cozying up to Moscow, which has launched a campaign to woo Free World nations since top Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev rose to power. Moscow's "peace offensive" includes an offer to pull out of the naval and air force facilities in Vietnam if the United States also leaves the Clark Air Base and the Subic Bay Naval facilities in the Philippines.

As part of the campaign, the Soviet Union for the first time extended invitations to armed forces of countries outside its bloc to send observers to the war game during July 10-12.

A total of 15 countries have been invited: the United States, China, Australia, Canada, India, North Korea, Vietnam, Japan, New Zealand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Brunei and Thailand.

Arrangements have been made for the military delegations to fly to Khabarovsk City in the Soviet Union and from there, the Soviet hosts will foot the rest of the bills until the end of the observation trips.

About 20 frigates and cruisers, including three nuclear-powered, nine replenishment ships, a variety of 37 aircraft and helicopters, and about 10,000 troops are taking part in the naval rehearsal.

The first phase is based on a war scenario that the Soviet force effectively foils a mock-up hostile submarine attack on Vladivostok naval base while in the following war scenario, to be staged July 12, the Soviet fleet will counter a hostile enemy air raid.

In the last phase, held July 12 afternoon, Soviet battle-ships will rehearse protecting a fleet of escorts from a simulated attack by an enemy fleet of battleships.

## INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

### Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee Summit Meeting

#### Delegates Listed

AU0707193489 Bucharest AGERPRES in English  
1831 GMT 7 Jul 89

["Meeting of the Consultative Committee of the States Participating in the Warsaw Treaty"—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES, 07/07/1989—The meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the state participating in the Warsaw Treaty started in Bucharest on Friday, 7 July.

The meeting is attended:

For the People's Republic of Bulgaria by Todor Zhivkov, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP], president of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, head of the delegation; Georgi Atanasov, member of the Political Bureau of the CC [Central Committee] of the BCP, chairman of the Council of Ministers, Dobri Dzhurov, member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the BCP, minister of national defence, Petur Mladenov, member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the BCP, minister of foreign affairs, Dimitur Stanishchev, secretary of the CC of the BCP.

For the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic by Milos Jakes, secretary-general of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, head of the delegation; Gustav Husak, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, president of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Ladislav Adamec, member of the Presidium of the CC of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, prime minister, Josef Lenart, member of the Presidium, secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Jaromir Johanes, minister of foreign affairs, Milan Vlacik, member of the CC of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, minister of national defence.

For the German Democratic Republic by Erich Honnecker, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SUPG], chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, head of the delegation; Willi Stoph, member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the SUPG, chairman of the Council of Ministers, Hermann Axen, member of the Political Bureau, secretary of the CC of the SUPG, Heinz Kessler, member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the SUPG, minister of national defence, Egon Krenz, member of the Political Bureau, secretary of the CC of the SUPG, vice-chairman of the Council of State, Guenter

Mittag, member of the Political Bureau, secretary of the CC of the SUPG, vice-chairman of the Council of State, Oskar Fischer, member of the CC of the SUPG, minister of foreign affairs.

For the Hungarian People's Republic by Rezső Nyers, president of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, head of the delegation; Miklós Nemeth, chairman of the Council of Ministers, Gyula Horn, minister of foreign affairs, Ferencz Karpáti, minister of national defence.

For the Polish People's Republic by Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party [PUWP], president of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic, head of the delegation; Mieczysław Rakowski, member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the PUWP, chairman of the Council of Ministers, Józef Czyrek, member of the Political Bureau, secretary of the CC of the PUWP, Czesław Kiszczak, member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the PUWP, minister of internal affairs, Florian Siwicki, member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the PUWP, minister of national defence, Tadeusz Olechowski, minister of foreign affairs.

For the Socialist Republic of Romania by Nicolae Ceaușescu, general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party [RCP], president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, head of the delegation; Constantin Dăscălescu, member of the Executive Political Committee of the CC of the RCP, prime minister, Ion Stoian, alternate member of the Executive Political Committee, secretary of the CC of the RCP, Vasile Milea, alternate member of the Executive Political Committee of the CC of the RCP, minister of national defence, Ioan Totu, alternate member of the Executive Political Committee of the CC of the RCP, minister of foreign affairs.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Union, president of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, head of the delegation; Nikolay Ryzhkov, member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPSU, chairman of the Council of Ministers, Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPSU, minister of foreign affairs, Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPSU, secretary of the CC of the CPSU, Dmitri Yazov, candidate member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPSU, minister of defence.

The proceedings of the meeting are also attended by Army General Petr Lushev, commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces, and Army General Vladimir Lobov, chief of staff of the Joint Armed Forces.

Opening the proceedings, Nicolae Ceaușescu welcomed the presence in Bucharest of the party and state leaders of the countries participating in the meeting as well as of the other members of the delegations and underscored



the special importance of the current meeting in giving an impetus to the disarmament, peace and collaboration process in Europe and worldwide.

During the meetings held in the morning and in the afternoon the floor was taken by the heads of the countries participating in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty.

The proceedings of the meeting continue.

#### **Arms Issues on Agenda**

*LD0707204589 Prague Domestic Service in Czech  
1630 GMT 7 Jul 89*

[Excerpts] The Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee [PCC] session began today in Bucharest. Here is a report from our special correspondent Pavel Kopecky:

[Begin recording] The session is taking place in the Palace of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania in the very center of Bucharest. [passage omitted]

Today's meeting was divided into two sessions. The morning session began with all those present observing a minute's silence in memory of the deceased politicians Andrey Gromyko and Janos Kadar. Then the host country's leader, Nicolae Ceausescu, gave a welcoming speech. During today's sessions which, in line with the PCC's rules of procedure, were chaired by Mikhail Gorbachev and Milos Jakes, speeches were made by the leaders of all seven delegations. They reviewed developments in Europe and the rest of the world and assessed all the changes which have taken place since the last session a year ago in Warsaw. They noted that thanks to the active policy of the socialist countries and the activity of all peace-loving and realistic forces, definite positive results have been attained in international relations—a reduction in tension and confrontation and increased trust between East and West.

Today's agenda included, in particular, issues connected with the current situation in Europe and the rest of the world and the basic goals and principles of the seven allied countries' foreign policy in the interests of developing cooperation, disarmament, and preserving peace.

The participants at the session concentrated on questions of building confidence and security on the European and world scale, and on other steps to eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons. Particular attention was paid to issues of reducing conventional weapons in Europe, the problem of short-range missiles, and substantial cuts in military spending.

The session voiced full support for the new Soviet proposals made on Thursday at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg by Mikhail Gorbachev.

Later this evening there is to be a festive dinner in honor of all the delegations hosted by Nicolae Ceausescu.

The Warsaw Pact's PCC session resumes tomorrow here in Bucharest to adopt the final documents. Meetings are also expected between party and state leaders on an individual basis. [end recording]

#### **Hungary's Nyers on Forces Reduction**

*LD0807083789 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian  
0500 GMT 8 Jul 89*

[Excerpt] There is a possibility for reducing the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. This was said by Rezso Nyers at the summit meeting of the Warsaw Pact which began yesterday. Miklos Martin-Kovacs reports on the work of the Political Consultative body.

[Martin-Kovacs] In the relations of the socialist countries, it is necessary to respect fully the national characteristics and a freedom in path-seeking, emphasized Rezso Nyers, head of the Hungarian delegation, at the Bucharest summit meeting of the Warsaw Pact. By the way, at the closed session, the delegations are consulting over the documents which, according to reports, also will contain new elements of the disarmament process. The cautious wording hints that an overwhelming sensation can scarcely be expected, but in any event, in order to make an assessment it is necessary to wait for the documents themselves, which will be signed today, according to plans. [passage omitted]

#### **Modernization Initiative Discussed**

*LD0807103289 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian  
0650 GMT 8 Jul 8*

[Excerpts] The Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee has been meeting in Bucharest since Friday. Miklos Martin-Kovacs reports on the meeting.

[Martin-Kovacs] [passage omitted] By the way, it has been this year that the members of the Warsaw Pact have begun to prove tangibly that they take disarmament seriously, and that they are considerably and continuously reducing their armed forces and weapons. Of course, further details are being discussed in Bucharest, but a very essential and new element is a proposal, which for the most part is Hungarian. One of the Soviet experts had this to say about the proposal: The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party's proposal for the modernization of the Warsaw Pact and for the democratic development of its organization is an extremely timely and constructive initiative. The time is not yet ripe for a simultaneous dissolution of the two military blocs, Warsaw Pact and NATO. The NATO summit at the end of May categorically rejected the idea of dissolving the organization.

Thus, there remains the other path, to the effect that the two organizations' military opposition be pushed to the background, and also an increase in the role of the political elements.

According to Hungarian opinion, the time has also come for the Warsaw Pact forums to be freed of formal elements and for differing opinions to be given space in the documents. Well, on this occasion it is not certain that this is how it will be, but the initiative itself is essential, since it is an organization which moves with some difficulty.

Otherwise, the position of the Hungarian leaders is unequivocal: The Warsaw Pact members should exploit the advantages latent in the political alliance, and it in no way is the task of the organization to intervene in the internal affairs of individual countries.

Probably a lot of people in Hungary have quite rightly taken note of the fact that the highest level Hungarian leaders have traveled here to Bucharest, to the capital of the country with which Hungary has serious differences of view. I make the comment: The reporters sense that the main role in Bucharest goes to multilateral talks, and the Hungarian leaders went to the Romanian capital as the scheduled location for the session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative body. [passage omitted]

#### **Ceausescu Gives Dinner**

AU0707195589 Bucharest AGERPRES in English  
1903 GMT 7 Jul 89

["Official Dinner"—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES, 07/07/1989—Nicolae Ceausescu, general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, gave an official dinner, on Friday, in honour of the delegations attending the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty states.

Attending were Todor Zhivkov general secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, president of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Milos Jakes, secretary-general of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Erich Honecker, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Rezso Nyers, president of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, president of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic, Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, president of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the members of the delegations attending the meeting.

In the attendance were members and alternate members of the Executive Political Committee of the Romanian Communist Party's Central Committee, secretaries of the party's Central Committee, members of the State Council and of the government, other officials.

Present were Army General Petr Lushev, commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces, army general Vladimir Lobov, chief of staff of the Joint Armed Forces.

The heads of the diplomatic missions of the respective countries in Bucharest also took part.

During the dinner held in a cordial, friendly atmosphere, Nicolae Ceausescu and Mikhail Gorbachev proposed toasts.

#### **Ceausescu Toasts Delegates**

AU1007091089 Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian  
8 Jul 89 pp 1, 3

["Toast by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu"]

[Text] Dear comrades,

I am pleased to warmly greet also in this framework all chief delegates and all delegations to the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty socialist states on behalf of our party and state leadership and of myself.

Today's meeting has discussed highly important questions of the international situation, first of all the questions of nuclear disarmament, of the ensurance of peace and cooperation among all the nations of the world.

Furthermore, there was an outstanding exchange of opinions on certain questions of economic and social collaboration, of socialist construction in our countries.

One may say that the documents adopted on this occasion reflect the joint positions of all participants in the meeting.

The declaration that was adopted and the communique firmly convey the determination of the Warsaw Treaty socialist countries to take action with a full sense of responsibility for the achievement of disarmament, nuclear disarmament first of all, for the conventional arms reduction talks in Vienna to end with the best possible results and in the shortest possible time.

By common agreement, our countries underscored that the existence of nuclear armaments is a great threat to peace, to the lives of all peoples, indeed to life on our planet and unanimously stand for a resolute passage to the liquidation of nuclear arms, for NATO to renounce the modernization of its nuclear weapons, its "nuclear deterrence" policy that sharply contradicts the aspirations of all peoples for peace and collaboration.

The Warsaw Treaty socialist countries are calling firmly for further resolute steps to be taken on the path of liquidating all nuclear armaments until the year 2000, for negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America to reduce strategic nuclear weapons by 50 percent to end with the best possible results. They are for an end to nuclear tests, for the renunciation of all programmes of the militarization of space.

We hope that all NATO countries will understand that the Warsaw Treaty states' position stems from the supreme interests of peace and collaboration among nations and will answer accordingly.

The debates, and the documents adopted by the Warsaw Treaty member countries rightly stress that new measures are needed in the direction of disarmament and security in Europe, for new relations set on full equality that should ensure the economic and social progress of each people, strengthen the cooperation and unity of the European states without distinction as to social system, leading the way to the achievements of a united Europe of free and independent countries.

The meeting rightly stressed during its works that one should not forget the lessons of history on the activity of various rightist, fascist organizations that plan a repeat of the situation before the second world war. Hence, fascist, revanchist organizations should firmly be rejected and their activity banned, the way to new adventures should be barred.

Mankind cannot forget, fifty years after the outbreak of the Second World War, the tremendous loss of life for the defeat of fascism, for the ensurance of the independence and security of all states.

The great sacrifices and the particular contribution of the Soviet Union to this war are known and I want to emphasize this in this context too.

It is for this reason that our countries and I would say all European countries which had to suffer from the second world war in one way or another—including, I would like to stress, the sacrifice of the German people itself—should take action with a full sense of responsibility and do their utmost not to allow the causes that led to the outbreak of that war to repeat themselves in any way.

Let us step up our collaboration, let us strengthen our unity, the common fight for peace, for independence, for the free future of our peoples.

An important place was rightly held at the meeting on the questions of economic and technical-scientific cooperation of our countries, the improvement of our collaboration and cooperation a view to overcoming certain

problems that arose, promoting the economic and social development of each people, development on the path of socialism, raising the welfare of peoples, and ensuring their independence.

In consideration of all this, of the adopted documents, one may say that, overall, the meeting stands out as landmark for future cooperation, both on an international plane and in the construction of socialism in our countries.

Trusting that the decisions we have adopted will strengthen the collaboration and solidarity of our parties and countries, please give your parties and peoples the revolutionary salute of the Romanian Communist Party, of the Romanian people, along with the wishes for new and significant successes in socioeconomic development on the path of socialism, in the policy of disarmament, collaboration and peace in Europe and the world over.

With this I wish to propose a toast:

- To the strengthening of friendship, collaboration and solidarity of our parties, countries and peoples, of all the peoples of the world.
- To the victory of socialism in our countries.
- To disarmament, liberty and independence.
- To security, progress and peace around the world.
- To the health of you all! (lively applause)

#### Document Urging Arms Cuts Adopted

PM0907162589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Jul 89  
Second Edition pp 1, 2

[“For a Stable and Secure Europe Free of Nuclear and Chemical Weapons and for a Substantial Reduction in Armed Forces, Armaments, and Military Spending”]

[Text] The supreme representatives of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, who gathered in Bucharest 7-8 July 1989 for a conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member-states, proceeding from the realities of the contemporary world and guided by the aspiration of their states to secure stable security in Europe, to achieve further progress in the work of disarmament, and actively to promote the restructuring of international relations on new principles and the transition of mankind to a new stage of development in conditions of peace and cooperation, state the following:

#### I

The Warsaw Pact member-states consider the highest goal of their foreign policy to be the strengthening of peace, the freeing of mankind from the threat of war, and



the development of broad, mutually advantageous international cooperation. They intend to go on contributing in the future, as well, to the insuring of all-embracing and equal security by all possible means.

The states represented at the conference confirm their resolution to do everything to achieve new accords in the field of disarmament, and to make the process of disarmament a continuous and irreversible one. They are in favor of overcoming underdevelopment, of asserting a new international economic order, and of an urgent solution to ecological and other global problems.

The solution of problems on which the survival of mankind and the progress of civilization depends, demands joint efforts, and the active participation of all countries and peoples. In this context, the states represented at the conference stress the necessity of stepping up the role of the United Nations and their readiness to help with this in every way.

The Warsaw Pact member-states are resolutely in favor of insuring security, not by military, but by political means; of asserting the primacy of international law in interstate relations; of maintaining normal relations between states, irrespective of their social and political systems; of rejecting confrontation and hostility in favor of a policy of partnership, mutual understanding, trust, and good-neighborliness; of the reciprocal taking into account of the interests of all states and peoples; of cooperation in the field of human rights and in the humanitarian field, taking into account the obligations they have taken upon themselves.

The following are vital requirements of the policy of security, mutual understanding, and cooperation between states: Strict respect for the national independence, sovereignty, and equality of rights of all states, the equality of rights of peoples, and the right of each people to self-determination and a free choice of ways for their own sociopolitical development; noninterference in internal affairs; unconditional repudiation of the use of force or the threat of force in whatever form; strict respect for established territorial and political realities, for the inviolability of existing borders, and for the territorial integrity of states; settlement of any disputes between states by exclusively peaceful means; realization in every country of complete human rights and basic liberties for all, without regard to race, sex, language, religion, or nationality; development of cooperation between states in various spheres on the basis of mutual benefit; conscientious fulfillment of obligations under international law; observance of all the principles and goals of the UN Charter, the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, and other universally recognized norms of international relations.

In the conditions of growing interdependence in the modern world, the implementation of all these principles and provisions would aid the confirmation of universal human values and norms of conduct in international relations.

The Warsaw Pact member-states confirm their willingness to develop and deepen their dialogue with all states and to cooperate with them constructively for the sake of resolving the tasks facing Europe and the world. Such dialogue and cooperation are particularly necessary at the present crucial point in the development of the international situation.

## II

Considering the removal of the threat of nuclear and conventional war and the strengthening of international security to be an objectively necessary condition for the survival and progress of mankind, the Warsaw Pact member-states consider disarmament and the ending of the arms race to be the main task of the present day.

Growing recognition by governments and peoples of the common nature of security interests has made it possible for the first steps to be taken in the matter of lowering military confrontation. The possibility of moving over from senseless, dangerous military rivalry to the peaceful cooperation of states has made its appearance. In this connection, the participants in the conference note the particularly important significance of the treaty eliminating intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, the implementation of which has marked the start of the process of physically destroying nuclear armaments, and also the businesslike atmosphere that has been coming into being at a number of disarmament forums recently.

However, there has been no radical breakthrough in the matter of disarmament yet. Despite the fact that both alliances have recognized that another war must not be permitted, the level of military confrontation remains inordinately high and dangerous. NATO's endeavors to continue its policy from a position of strength and to pursue the strategy of nuclear deterrence cannot fail to arouse concern.

The Warsaw Pact member-states consider that under these circumstances vigorous actions are required from all countries, all peace-loving and realistically minded forces. Proceeding from the concept of mutual and indivisible security, they are decisively in favor of putting it into effect by maintaining the military balance at a minimum level, sufficient only for defense, and ruling out the possibility of a sudden attack and of conducting large-scale offensive operations. Their objective is to reduce arms until the threat of war is totally eliminated. This objective can be attained only as a result of mutual efforts, with the utmost reinforcement of the political rather than the military elements of security and stability.

They confirm their willingness to continue seeking, jointly with all countries concerned, accords leading to a stage-by-stage reduction and the subsequent total scrapping of nuclear arms, to the banning and destruction of chemical weapons, to a radical reduction of conventional



armed forces, to the prevention of the spreading of the arms race into space, to the gradual curtailment of military production, and to a considerable reduction in military expenditures. At the same time, they proceed from the view that disarmament measures should insure equal security for all states, with full respect for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of every state within its existing borders, and rule out the possibility of the use of force or the threat of force in relations between states.

Expressing satisfaction at the resumption of Soviet-U.S. talks on highly important aspects of disarmament, the allied states express their hope for the rapid attainment of practical results at them.

They view the conclusion of the elaboration of a treaty on a 50-percent reduction in the strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and United States, while observing the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972, as a priority aim.

The states represented at the conference advocate the immediate cessation of nuclear weapons testing and attentive consideration of this issue, including on a multilateral basis, and specifically at the Geneva disarmament conference. They advocate the conclusion within a very short period of time of the elaboration of verification protocols to the Soviet-U.S. treaties of 1974 and 1976, and the implementation of these treaties as a step toward the full cessation of nuclear testing. The Warsaw Pact member-states support the idea of the possible extension of the 1963 Moscow Treaty on the banning of nuclear weapons tests in three environments to cover underground testing as one way of resolving as rapidly as possible the task of banning nuclear weapons testing.

On the agenda is the task of stopping, and in the long term prohibiting the production of fissionable material for weapons, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and also of missile technology for military purposes. Insuring the defense of peaceful nuclear installations against attack is an important task.

Those taking part in the conference are concerned over the danger presented to peace and international security by the threat of the use of chemical weapons while they still exist and proliferate. They propose that effective measures be adopted to eliminate this threat. They call for the preparation of an international convention on the universal and total prohibition of chemical weapons and on the destruction of stockpiles of them to be speeded up.

A key issue of security and stability in Europe is the reduction of conventional armed forces, the reduction and subsequent elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, and the strengthening of trust on the continent.

Those taking part in the conference see as an immediate goal for the talks on conventional armed forces in Europe to be to arrive, as a result of an initial agreement, at maximum collective levels in troop numbers and in the quality of basic types of weapons in Europe and in individual regions of Europe, which are identical for both the NATO and Warsaw Pact states. In this respect, the new levels would be considerably lower than the very lowest levels in existence for either side at present. The corresponding proposals from the allied socialist countries, which were submitted in Vienna, envisage a radical reciprocal cut in troops and weapons. This also would resolve the problem of getting rid of imbalances in the field of conventional weapons. The reduction and limitation of armed forces and weapons would be implemented, subject to strict international verification.

It was noted at the conference that the additional proposals on conventional armed forces in Europe, which were put forward at the recent NATO Council summit session, move toward the positions of the allied socialist countries. The participants in the conference expect that they will be worked out in detail and placed upon the negotiating table in Vienna in the very near future. The resolve of the Warsaw Pact member-countries to do everything possible to achieve positive results at the Vienna talks as soon as possible was confirmed and the opinion was expressed that the situation that has arisen there, given the constructive approach of all participants, would make it possible to reach initial accords in 1990. The experts will be given instructions to work out the appropriate proposals as a matter of urgency.

The practical steps being undertaken by the Warsaw Pact member-states in implementation of their defense doctrine—for the unilateral reduction of their armed forces and armaments, for giving them a clearly expressed nonoffensive structure, and also for cutting down the production of armaments and military expenditures—are aimed at creating favorable material and political prerequisites for the consistent continuation of the process of limiting armaments and lowering the level of military confrontation.

The Warsaw Pact member-states expect the NATO countries to adopt reciprocal measures to cut their armed forces, armaments, and military expenditures and military activities.

The participants in the conference came out in favor of the strict observance of the Stockholm accords, the adoption of fresh measures at the talks of the 35 CSCE participant states to strengthen confidence and security in development of them, and the spread of notification, observation, and limitation measures to all aspects of the states' military activity, including the activity of air and naval forces.

The creation of a center for reducing the military danger and preventing a sudden attack in Europe—an organ with informative and consultative functions—is called

upon to be a considerable contribution to the strengthening of trust and security and the enhancement of stability on the continent.

Other proposals put forward at talks by the Warsaw Pact member-states also are aimed at attaining the goals of strengthening trust and security.

The convening of a meeting of the leaders of the 35 CSCE participant states at which the results achieved in these spheres would be examined and tasks for the future would be defined could also be a major step capable of bringing the disarmament process and the strengthening of European security to a qualitatively new level.

The allied socialist states express their hope that discussion of military doctrines, their nature, their political and military-technical aspects, and their further evolution would assist a transition to military concepts and doctrines based on strictly defensive principles.

Stability and security in Europe cannot be complete and sufficiently reliable without a solution to the problem of tactical nuclear means. Moreover, as conventional armaments are cut, the destabilizing role of tactical nuclear weapons inevitably will grow. In this connection, NATO's plans to modernize its tactical nuclear weapons arouse particular concern.

Having noted a certain development in the position of the NATO countries with regard to negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the Warsaw Pact member-states call on the NATO countries to tackle the problem of tactical nuclear weapons, not by way of modernization, but by way of independent negotiations aimed at a stage-by-stage reduction of these weapons, and they confirm their proposal in this respect.

Those participating in the conference expressed backing for the Soviet Union's intention to start negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons and to embark on further unilateral reductions of the tactical nuclear missiles it has in Europe if the NATO countries are willing.

They also support the Soviet Union's decision to unilaterally withdraw from the territories of the allied socialist countries 500 tactical nuclear warheads as early as this year, as well as its declaration of readiness to withdraw all nuclear munitions [boyepripsy] from the territories of its allies during 1989-91 on condition that the United States takes an analogous step in response.

The Warsaw Pact states are convinced that a stage-by-stage reduction, followed by elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, alongside a radical reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons, would be an effective means of reducing military danger and strengthening mutual trust.

In tackling the problem of insuring security and stability at an increasingly low level of military balance, one cannot fail to take account of the importance of naval forces and their armaments, as well as naval activities, which are capable of exerting a destabilizing effect upon the situation and of creating a threat to security in Europe and other regions. The conference participants advocate stepping up dialogue on these problems and consider it essential to start separate negotiations between naval states with an interest in this, primarily major ones, in order to examine these problems.

It was emphasized at the conference that reduction of military expenditure enables the funds released to be allocated to the needs of socioeconomic development. In this connection, effective solution of the problem of conversion of military production assumes important significance, and could be the subject of international consultations, including within the framework of the United Nations.

The great significance was also noted of joint and individual initiatives intended to assist the solution of the security problem with application to certain regions of the continent, in particular on the creation of a nuclear-free corridor and a zone free of chemical weapons in Central Europe; on cutting armaments and enhancing trust in Central Europe; on the creation of a zone of trust, cooperation, and good-neighborly relations along a line of contact between states of the two alliances; on the creation of a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons in the Balkans; on the transformation of the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and cooperation; and on a radical reduction of the level of military confrontation in northern Europe. They support practical multilateral and bilateral measures aimed at implementing these initiatives.

The Warsaw Pact states believe that disarmament measures should be accompanied by strict and adequate verification measures. They are prepared to adopt the most effective solutions leading to the creation of an all-embracing disarmament verification system. The United Nations could play a positive role in this context.

The Warsaw Pact states recall their recent appeal to the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance calling upon them to use the opportunities now opening up to fully overcome the consequences of the Cold War in Europe and throughout the world. They confirm their principled position in favor of dissolving both military-political alliances.

### III

The task of insuring stability and security in Europe, of establishing here relations of a new type, based on overcoming confrontation and strengthening trust and good-neighborly relations, continues to remain at the center of the efforts of the Warsaw Pact member-states.

They advocate development of broad, equal, and mutually beneficial cooperation in various spheres, and also advocate that all countries and peoples should take part in tackling the vital problems of the continent. The all-European process should continue to remain the chief support in building a new Europe.

Expressing their firm intention to assist the deepening of the Helsinki process in every possible way, the conference participants proceed from the fact that creation of a Europe of peace and cooperation is impossible in isolation from everything that has been created on the continent, both over the course of centuries and in recent decades. The differences between individual states or groupings should not hinder mutual understanding and interaction. On the contrary, the diversity of experience of the European peoples can become a source of mutual enrichment. In this connection, it is important for the processes taking place in various parts of the continent to promote the development of interstate relations on a bilateral, multilateral, and all-European basis.

The states represented at the conference attach great importance to increasing mutually advantageous economic and scientific—technical cooperation among CSCE participant-countries. This would allow each country to make the optimum use of its material and human resources and of the possibilities for an international division of labor in the interests of social and economic development. It is essential to remove the obstacles and restrictions on the path of developing trade, scientific, technical, and production contacts, and to expand reciprocal access to modern technologies.

The question of developing and deepening multilateral and bilateral cooperation in solving urgent ecological problems has become especially keen. Europe could become an example in this regard.

The expansion of interaction in the humanitarian field, assisting intercourse between people, the development of cooperation in the field of the exchange and dissemination of information, as well as the encouragement of cooperation and exchanges in the field of culture and education are an inalienable part of efforts aimed at improving the situation in Europe.

One of the basic prerequisites for insuring peace and cooperation in Europe is the implementation in each country of the whole aggregate of the rights and basic freedoms of man as set down in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and in international pacts on human rights, in the Helsinki Final Act, as well as in other documents adopted within the framework of the United Nations and of the common European process. The Warsaw Pact member-states are in favor of a complete implementation of the civil, political, economic, social, cultural, and other rights in their interdependence.

The strengthening of peace and security in Europe would promote the solution of many complicated social problems affecting the peoples of the continent, as well as insuring man's right to life and work.

The participants in the meeting stressed the need to repulse decisively any manifestations of revanchism and chauvinism and any forms of hostility between peoples. They share the concern of the public in West European countries in connection with the intensifying manifestations of neofascism there.

The allied socialist states attach prime importance to insuring military, political, and territorial stability in Europe. They proceed from the premise that all peoples should determine for themselves the fate of their country and are entitled to choose their sociopolitical and economic systems and the state structure that they deem suitable for themselves. There cannot be a single standard for the organization of society.

Stability presupposes the renunciation of confrontational doctrines and of the gamble on force, and the inadmissibility of direct and indirect interference in the internal affairs of other states. No country should dictate the course of events inside another country, or claim the role of judge or referee.

#### IV

The People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic are prepared to expand their cooperation and their search for accords with the participant countries in the all-European process and with all states concerned for the purpose of a radical reduction in armaments, and of disarmament and strengthening security and stability on the European continent; a transition from confrontation to partnership in relations among states; and the creation of a Europe of durable peace, good-neighborliness, and cooperation. Any constructive steps and proposals in this direction will be received with understanding and support on the part of the allied socialist states.

[Signed] For the People's Republic of Bulgaria:  
Todor Zhivkov,

General secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party  
Central Committee and chairman of the State Council of  
the People's Republic of Bulgaria;

For the Hungarian People's Republic:

Rezső Nyers,

Chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party;

For the German Democratic Republic:

Erich Honecker,

General secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany  
Central Committee and chairman of the GDR  
Council of State;



For the Polish People's Republic:

Wojciech Jaruzelski,

First secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee and chairman of the State Council of the Polish People's Republic;

For the Socialist Republic of Romania:

Nicolae Ceausescu,

General secretary of the Romanian Communist Party and president of the Socialist Republic of Romania;

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

M.S. Gorbachev,

General secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet;

For the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic:

Milos Jakes,

General secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee.

[Dated] Bucharest, 8 July 1989

#### Communique Published

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["Communique of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee Conference"—for the full text of the communique, see the FBIS Daily Report: SOVIET UNION, FBIS-SOV-89-130, 10 July 1989, pp 12-15]

[Excerpts] On 7-8 July, 1989 a conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance was held in Bucharest. Taking part in it were:

From the People's Republic of Bulgaria: Todor Zhivkov, Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] Central Committee secretary general and People's Republic of Bulgaria Council of State chairman, the head of the delegation; Georgi Antasov, BCP Central Committee Politburo member and People's Republic of Bulgaria Council of Ministers chairman; Dobri Dzhurov, BCP Central Committee Politburo member and People's Republic of Bulgaria minister of national defense; Petur Mladenov, BCP Central Committee politburo member and People's Republic of Bulgaria minister of foreign affairs; Dimitur Stanishev, BCP Central Committee secretary;

From the Hungarian People's Republic: Rezso Nyers, Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party [MSZMP] chairman, the head of the delegation; Miklos Nemeth, Hungarian People's Republic Council of Ministers chairman; Gyula Horn, Hungarian People's Republic minister of foreign affairs; Ferenc Karpati, Hungarian People's Republic minister of defense.

For the German Democratic Republic: Erich Honecker, general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] Central Committee, chairman of the GDR Council of State and head of the delegation; Willi Stoph, member of the SED Central Committee Politburo, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers; Hermann Axen,

member of the SED Central Committee Politburo, secretary of the SED Central Committee; Heinz Kessler, member of the SED Central Committee Politburo, GDR minister of national defence; Egon Krenz, member of the SED Central Committee Politburo, secretary of the SED Central Committee, deputy chairman of the GDR council of state; Guenter Mittag, member of the SED Central Committee Politburo, secretary of the SED Central Committee, deputy chairman of the GDR Council of State; Oskar Fischer, member of the SED Central Committee, GDR minister of foreign affairs.

For the Polish People's Republic [PPR]: Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party [PZPR] Central Committee, chairman of the PPR Council of State, head of the delegation; Mieczyslaw Rakowski, member of the PZPR Central Committee Politburo, chairman of the PPR council of ministers; Jozef Czyrek, member of the PZPR Central Committee Politburo, secretary of the PZPR Central Committee; Czeslaw Kiszczak, member of the PZPR Central Committee Politburo, PPR minister of internal affairs; Florian Siwicki, member of the PZPR Central Committee politburo, PPR minister of national defense; Tadeusz Olechowski, PPR minister of foreign affairs.

From the Socialist Republic of Romania: Nicolae Ceausescu, Romanian Communist Party [RCP] general secretary, Socialist Republic of Romania president, head of the delegation; Constantin Dascalescu, RCP Central Committee Political Executive Committee [PEC] member, Socialist Republic of Romania prime minister; Ion Stoian, RCP Central Committee PEC candidate member, RCP Central Committee secretary; Vasile Milea, RCP Central Committee PEC candidate member, Socialist Republic of Romania minister of national defense; Ioan Totu, RCP Central Committee PEC candidate member, Socialist Republic of Romania minister of foreign affairs;

From the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, head of the delegation; N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs; A.N. Yakovlev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Defense Minister;

From the CSSR—Milos Jakes, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, head of the delegation; Gustav Husak, member of the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] Central Committee and president of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic; Ladislav Adamec, member of the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee and premier of the CSSR government; Jozef Lenart, member of the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee, secretary of the cpcz central committee; Jaromir Johanes, CSSR Minister of

Foreign Affairs; Milan Vaclavik, member of the CPCZ Central Committee and, CSSR Minister of National Defense. Also taking part in the work of the conference were Army General P.G. Lushev, commander in chief of the joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states, and Constantin Oancea, general secretary of the political consultative committee and Romanian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Those taking part in the conference exchanged views of the developing international situation and discussed the main directions of the cooperation of the allied states in the interests of peace and stability in Europe, disarmament, and deepening international dialogue and cooperation.

It was pointed out that, thanks to the active policy of the socialist states and the actions of all peace-loving forces of a realistic turn of mind, it has been possible to achieve certain positive shifts in international affairs, to reduce tension and confrontation, enhance trust, develop political dialogue, and intensify contacts between states at various levels. The first steps have been taken in the sphere of disarmament, and a mechanism of verification has been set up and is working effectively. The start of the Vienna negotiations is encouraging. Cooperation is expanding in the economic and scientific and technical spheres, and in the sphere of human rights. Progress has been achieved in political settlement of regional conflicts. There is growing readiness on the part of the world community to interact in the sphere of security and solution of global problems.

At the same time, the situation in the world remains complex and contradictory, and favorable processes have not yet become irreversible. The growth and modernization of weapons are not ceasing. Nuclear tests and work aimed at militarization of space are continuing, the concepts of confrontation and reliance on force which were established in the years of the Cold War are being surmounted with difficulty. The strategy of nuclear deterrence which was confirmed afresh at the recent session of the NATO Council remains a dangerous anachronism which is at variance with the interests of universal security. There are instances of the practice of interference in the internal affairs of other states, and attempts to destabilize them, and of violation of human rights.

Those taking part in the conference confirmed their states' adherence to the ideal of ridding mankind of the threat of war by eliminating nuclear and chemical weapons and by radically cutting conventional weapons. They consider disarmament to be the current cardinal issue, a decisive factor for strengthening peace, security, and trust and for deepening detente, developing broad international cooperation, and for resolving global problems.

The Warsaw Pact participant states accord paramount importance to developing the all-European process in all areas, to bringing the continent to a new level of security

and cooperation, and to moving forward along the road of building an indivisible Europe of stable peace and cooperation, a common European home with a diversity of social and state systems in the countries, with respect for the territorial and political realities which have taken shape, the inviolable nature of existing borders, the sovereignty, and the right of every people to freely determine their own destiny. Determination was expressed to do the utmost to promote the implementation of the accords reached at the Vienna meeting to strengthen peace and security in Europe and to improve mutual understanding and cooperation on the continent.

The standpoint of the allied states on matters relating to securing European and general security and to continuing the disarmament process is set out in a statement adopted at the conference, "For a stable and secure Europe, free from nuclear and chemical weapons, for a substantial reduction in armed forces, armaments, and military expenditure."

The participants in the conference spoke in favor of transferring relations between the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic alliance to an avenue of nonconfrontation, setting up a constructive dialogue between them through political and military channels, and turning it into a factor of security and cooperation on the continent. The principled position of the Warsaw Pact member-states of liberating Europe from military blocs, on the simultaneous dissolution of both alliances, and, as a first step, on the elimination of their military organizations, thereby remains in force. [passage omitted]

The Warsaw Pact participant states will assist in all ways possible the fullest disclosure of the peacemaking potential of the United Nations with the participation of all countries, irrespective of their size or social structure, in solving world problems. They are in favor of enhancing the UN's effectiveness and of making wider use of that organization's operations to maintain peace. The importance of actively attaching the UN to efforts to prevent international crisis was stressed. [passage omitted]

The conference participants informed one another of the internal development in their own countries, of the course and the problems of socialist construction. They noted the growing interconnection between domestic and foreign policy. They stressed the strength of the influence of socialist ideas, the importance of the transformations being implemented in the allied states and directed toward improving and renewing socialist society, imparting a constant dynamism to its political and economic systems, developing democracy, enhancing people's well-being, improving the quality of life, revealing the capabilities of each individual, and safeguarding basic liberties and human rights. They proceed from the premise that no universal socialist models exist and that no one has a monopoly on truth. The construction of a new society is a creative process, which is being implemented in each country in accordance with its conditions, traditions, and requirements.

The conference reaffirmed the common desire to act in the interests of socialism, to improve cooperation among the allied states and to make reliable provision for their security. Confidence was expressed in the ability of the socialist states and of the leading forces of society to solve the problems that have arisen at the current stage of their development. Emphasis was also placed on the need to develop relations among them on a basis of equality, independence, and the right of each to develop independently its own political line, strategy and tactics without outside interference.

The conference participants were unanimous that the Warsaw Pact is reliably serving to provide for the security of its member-states and is an important factor for peace and stability in Europe and in the entire World.

The constructive actions of the allied countries, both individual and collective, are having a positive influence upon world processes and are stimulating the development of international relations on democratic principles, in the spirit of the new political thinking.

A shared opinion was expressed in favor of strengthening the solidarity and interaction of the allied states and of further developing their many-sided cooperation on a basis of equal rights and mutual respect for the benefit of the fraternal peoples and in the interests of world peace.

It was decided to continue efforts to strengthen the Warsaw Pact's political nature and to further improve the cooperation mechanism within it on a democratic basis.

A positive assessment was made of the work of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Committee of Ministers of Defense. Their further tasks were defined.

The Political Consultative Committee adopted a decision on the report of the commander in chief of the joint armed forces of the states participating in the Warsaw Pact.

As the country hosting the conference, the Socialist Republic of Romania is to ensure that conference documents are circulated among other states and international organizations.

USSR representative I.P. Aboimov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, was appointed general secretary of the Political Consultative Committee for the next term.

The conference took place in an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation.

The next conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the states participating in the Warsaw Pact will be held in Moscow.

## BULGARIA

### Commentaries Assess Results of Warsaw Pact Summit

#### BTA Commentary

AU0907185189 Sofia BTA in English  
1720 GMT 9 Jul 89

["The Socialist States' Policy Impact"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, July 9 (BTA Commentator Georgi Todorov)—The meeting of the first party and state leaders of the socialist countries—Warsaw Treaty member-states opened a new stage in the development of their common concept for constructive approach to all cardinal problems of our time. This was clearly expressed in the adopted documents of the session: The communique and the declaration "For Stable and Secure Europe, Free of Nuclear and Chemical Weapon, for Considerable Reduction of the Armed Forces, Armaments and Military Expenses".

The documents and the 2-day discussion in Bucharest stressed the active role of the policy of the European socialist states for the achievement of positive changes in the international situation, for lessening of the tension and the possibilities for confrontation, for strengthening confidence and the development of the political dialogue.

The journalists and the observers left Bucharest with the conviction that the 7 Warsaw Treaty member states consider as their historical duty and task of their diplomacy to broaden further the mechanism depending on them for the strengthening of the world peace, for the freeing of mankind from the nuclear threat, for broader mutually advantageous cooperation, for the establishing of a durable and functional international economic order.

In the same spirit the session expressed the conviction in the impact of the socialist ideas, the importance of transformations carried out by their peoples: With a stress on the need of improvement and innovation of the political and economic system, on the raising of the well being of the working people, for the guaranteeing of full and unconditional rights of each individual in the name of the future generations.

The need of further deepening of the cooperation and solidarity between the Warsaw Treaty member states on the base of equality and mutual respect in interest of their peoples and world peace was also stressed at the session.

What remains now is the partner from the "opposite side", or as it is pointed out in the communique the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to



support the idea for "nonconfrontation relations, for establishing of constructive dialogue on political and military line..." in the name of security and cooperation in the continent.

**Party Daily Editorial**

AU1107123189 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO  
in Bulgarian 10 Jul 89 p 1

[Editorial: "Joint Actions in the Name of Peace"]

[Excerpts] The supreme organ of the military-political alliance of the seven East European socialist countries, the Political Consultative Committee, has held a 2-day session in Bucharest. The work of the conference, which proceeded in a businesslike and constructive manner, in the traditional atmosphere of friendship and cooperation, once again confirms that these forums have always been an inspiring manifestation of collective intelligence and collective will, of agreed actions in the name of socialism and strengthening peace, security, and understanding in Europe and throughout the world.

In the declaration "For a Stable and Secure Europe, Free From Nuclear and Chemical Weapons, for a Significant Reduction of Armed Forces, Arms, and Military Expenditures" adopted by the member states, the allied socialist states defined as the highest goal of their foreign policy the strengthening of peace, freeing mankind from the threat of war, and developing wide mutually beneficial international cooperation. At the same time they identified halting the arms race and further disarmament as the chief task of the modern day. It is no secret that the declaration is a clear and precise response to the documents adopted at the recent jubilee session of the NATO Council in Brussels. Of course, the comparison between the meetings is not to NATO's advantage, because, in response to the North Atlantic Alliance holding to its nuclear deterrence strategy, which continues to be a source of military threat, the Bucharest declaration outlines the prospects of a Europe free of nuclear and chemical weapons, of reducing armed forces, armaments, and military budgets, and of maintaining the military equilibrium at the minimum level adequate for defense alone, to exclude the possibility of surprise attack and wide-scale offensive actions.

Close study of the adopted documents cannot fail to reveal views of Europe's future that are completely in harmony with the age-old interests of all its peoples. The documents adopted in the Romanian capital justify the growing international interest in the peace initiatives of the allied socialist states, because an important stress was placed in Bucharest on the values common to all states and peoples and on the need for joint actions to resolve the universal human tasks facing Europe and the world. [passage omitted]

When closing the Bucharest conference, the top Bulgarian leader stated that the chief goal now is to redouble our efforts to implement the conference decisions in

practice. As Comrade Todor Zhivkov emphasized, the agreed activity of the allied countries in the international arena and our successes in achieving our noble goals will help to accelerate the successful solution of the difficult and responsible tasks facing our countries and peoples.

**Editorial on Gorbachev's Council of Europe Speech**

AU1107194389 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO  
in Bulgarian 9 Jul 89 p 5

[Editorial: "Historically Based Approach"]

[Text] Convincing, clear, and specific, full of new ideas about the future—Mikhail Gorbachev's speech at the European Council evoked great interest and attracted the attention of the political circles throughout the world. Impressive in its depth and arguments, it is one of the indisputable phenomena in the most modern political history of Europe.

The first Soviet leader, analyzing the historical connection of the destinies and the mutual dependence of the European states, as well as modern realities, answered the great question of our time: What will the future be like for the peoples of the old continent, in what image will our mutually dependent world be cast, and what choice must the present politicians in East and West make? The situation in Europe today affords the unique opportunity of giving priority to human values, sending the postulates of the "Cold War" to the archives, and replacing the containment doctrine with the doctrine of restraint.

Recalling the deep roots of the European optimism and noble dreams of the great son of France, Victor Hugo, who said "...a day will come when the markets, open for trade, brains, and ideas, will be the only battlefield," Mikhail Gorbachev stressed that the idea of European unity must be collectively analyzed. The existence of two social systems is not and cannot be an obstacle to this unity, because the fact that the states belong to different systems is a reality and a historical given, and because the sovereign right of every nation to select its own social system is an important precondition of the normal European process. Helsinki, and afterward Stockholm and Vienna, brought this process to fundamentally new positions and expressed the striving toward changing international relations in the spirit of humanism, equality, and justice. Recent experience shows that it is possible to establish a peaceful order in Europe, and to base it on the principles of freedom of choice and balance of interests under conditions of decreasing military confrontation.

Dwelling on the importance of restructuring, Mikhail Gorbachev frankly spoke about the shortcomings and difficulties in the turning point period, while pointing out that the changes in the USSR have the role of a favorable factor in the international arena. He rejected the suspicions that the USSR intends to isolate the

United States from Europe and declared that the two most powerful states are a natural part of the European international political system, and their participation in its evolution has a historical basis.

The Soviet leader attributed special importance to the idea of the "European home," for whose implementation there are sufficient preconditions. The most important among them is the fact that the philosophy of the concept on constructing this "home" precludes the probability of a military conflict and the possibility of the use of force. Therefore, Mikhail Gorbachev gave priority to security issues. The results that have been achieved until now in the talks on the control over the weapons are encouraging. Despite the fact that the positions of NATO and the Warsaw Pact on the fundamental issue of the future of the nuclear arsenals seem to be diametrically opposite, Mikhail Gorbachev thinks that the differences should not be dramatized and that a solution must be sought. Europeans can travel the road toward the total elimination of the nuclear weapons together, without relinquishing their positions. The Warsaw Pact can remain loyal to its nuclear-free ideal, and NATO—loyal to the concept of "minimal containment." Such an approach does not prevent, but on the contrary facilitates, the rapid beginning of talks on tactical nuclear weapons among all interested sides.

After presenting the clear Soviet positions on the issues of disarmament, Mikhail Gorbachev also reviewed the problems of multilateral cooperation in the continent, which he defined as the foundation of the "common European home." Developing and expanding their economic, scientific-technical, and cultural relations, and conducting together a struggle for protecting the environment, the European peoples can respond to the challenge of the future, preserve their variety of forms and adhere to their common humane goals.

The ideas expressed in the speech of the Soviet leader in Strasbourg are not only based on history, they also fully fit into the logic of Europe's modern development. They are a passionate appeal for uniting the efforts of all countries and peoples for the construction of a common, peaceful, and democratic home, which will be the original example of the future more just and humane world.

#### **Army Daily Outlines Warsaw Pact's Past, Future Role**

*AU1107122589 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 7 Jul 89 pp 1, 3*

[Editorial: "Steadfast Defender of Peace and Socialism"]

[Text] For almost 35 years the history of the Warsaw Pact Organization has been a story of steadfast, loyal, and unstinted service to socialism, progress, liberty and independence of peoples, and peace in Europe and throughout the world. This is completely in line with the

organization's nature, spirit, and essence, its aims and tasks, in the name of which it was formed on 14 May 1955 in the Polish capital of Warsaw.

Everyone knows that the Warsaw Pact came into being only 10 years after the end of World War II, in which the Soviet Union brought Hitler's Germany to its knees, and when the united front of democratic forces led by the Soviet Union destroyed obscurantism, retrogression, reaction, fascism, and death. However, notwithstanding this victory of worldwide historical importance, the clouds of war and threats to peace hung low over the continent of Europe. War-loving forces, surviving fascist officers and generals who had taken refuge in various countries, and imperialism as a system could not reconcile themselves to the situation that had been created in Europe and the world. They did not want peace, they did not accept the military, economic, moral, and political victory over socialism won by the Soviet warriors in alliance with the antifascist forces in European and other states. The warmongers sought all possible ways to once again provoke confrontation in the world, to make one group of states oppose another, to sow dissensions, misunderstandings, schisms, destruction and lack of understanding, to calumniate and blackmail—all well-known techniques of the flagbearers of imperialism. As an epitome expressing the disagreement and dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union's great victory in the war, the victorious socialist revolution in a number of East European countries, and the world situation that had been created, on 17 March 1948 a number of states formed the first postwar military-political grouping—the Western Alliance. Only a year later, on 4 April 1949, 12 Western states founded NATO in the U.S. capital, Washington, thus creating in Europe and throughout the world a war risk situation, a real threat to the socialist countries, and not only to them.

There was a need for active, powerful counteraction to the aggressive nature, hostility, and self-seeking aims and intentions of NATO. Urgent measures needed to be taken for the collective defense of the territorial integrity, liberty, and independence of the socialist countries. The powerful military coalition of the imperialist states particularly intensified armament, and undermined peace. The world could not be left in this condition. A new approach was required to national, European, and world problems, a new view was needed, with decisive steps undertaken to defend peace. In his time, V.I. Lenin had developed his view on the problem of the collective defense of socialism and of creating an allied, invincible force with which to crush all imperialist attacks.

Such a force, such a collective military-political organization, was provided by the Warsaw Pact. This was a military-political alliance of a type that mankind had never known before, a completely new type of alliance whose members are fraternal sovereign states, and which proclaims as its banner the struggle for peace. This alliance threatens no one, does not want military conflicts, and is created precisely to prevent such conflicts.



From its very first day until the present, the alliance has been dominated by the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social orders, proletarian and socialist internationalism, respect for the sovereignty and independence of states, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, and mutual understanding in the name of progress and mankind's prosperity.

Marxist-Leninist doctrine proclaims the socialist countries' unity and cooperation as one of its valuable achievements, and this been fully confirmed in the Warsaw Pact Organization. This organization is living a rich life; events of real fraternal solidarity and aid are recorded in its history; within the organization, states and armies cooperate with one another, and hitherto unknown principles are created in practice of foreign-political and military cooperation free of selfish interest, built upon mutually beneficial, sovereign, honorable, and virtuous foundations. In the course of the years the mutual cooperation gave birth to previously unknown directions, forms, and methods, through which each member state achieves self-fulfillment, develops its sovereignty even more, and thus in fact helps to create a fighting military-political alliance with a humane, civilized essence. The annals of the most prominent events in the history of the Warsaw Pact categorically prove its noble aims and tasks. The Warsaw Pact makes an invaluable contribution to preserving and strengthening peace, reducing international tension, and promoting mutual understanding among states, as well as protecting the rights and independence of other states who are not members. In this sense the aims and goals of the Warsaw Pact have been made international, and peoples regard it as a sure guarantee for world peace.

The fact that the Warsaw Pact is the standard-bearer of peace is confirmed by the dozens of peace initiatives made by it at the most varied forums in Europe and throughout the world. There is hardly a single UN session at which one socialist state or another, or all of them acting in concert as a united friendly alliance, failed to put forward different initiatives for reducing international tension, increasing trust between states, and guaranteeing the independence of states. The new political thinking, in evaluating and resolving contemporary European, world, and international problems, as expressed and demonstrated by the USSR and the other socialist states, provides further practical proof of the Warsaw Pact's true aims and tasks. In essence it is a defensive fraternal alliance of sovereign states, and has no aims, tasks, and interests other than the aims, tasks, and interests of international security and world peace.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria is an equal member of the Warsaw Pact and is doing everything that is required of it to strengthen and develop the alliance and enrich its activity. Our country has taken a most active part in all the forums of the Warsaw Pact and has made proposals in the name of peace and the independence of peoples. The People's Republic of Bulgaria is very active in the

various structures of the organization. This is quite natural, because socialist Bulgaria is conducting a principled, honorable, peaceful policy, threatens no one, does not desire foreign territories, and does not pry into its neighbors' yards, nor does it want anyone to interfere in its own internal affairs. We are a peaceful working people, whose chief aim is to build up our state as a developed and civilized force. Under the leadership of the party, our people is engaged in constructive peaceful labor. Our country needs peace and a bright future, and for this reason we regard every threat as something from the times of the "cold war," as a feudal remnant. No one can divert us from the chosen true path of socialist construction, from the peace offensive of victories of labor, or from our desire to live in peace and good-neighborliness with the other Balkan countries. No one can divert us from the intense creative mood that has seized our country in fulfilling the party's plans. Our people has coped with all difficulties of every kind. They will also cope with the present temporary difficulties arising from the interference of other states in our internal affairs. The caravan moves on....

The Bulgarian People's Army from its very creation has been, and will continue to be, an army of the Communist Party, of the victorious socialist revolution, an army of the people. Today it is an equal ally of all the Armies of the Warsaw Pact. We are making our own contribution to strengthening our fighting military-political alliance, we are taking part in its various actions, and are creating a spirit of international solidarity, mutuality, friendship and comradeship, of true modern-day brotherhood.

Every act of the Warsaw Pact has been followed with great interest by the entire international public. This is completely natural, because on every occasion something new was proposed for improving the international climate and guaranteeing peace in the world. The conferences of the Political Consultative Committee are awaited with even greater interest. We are sure that from the forthcoming conference of the Political Consultative Committee in the Romanian capital Bucharest the world will obtain new ideas and initiatives for peace, which progressive mankind will welcome with pride, joy, and inspiration. The Bucharest meeting will enter history as a meeting of realism, of sober action, as a victory of the new political thinking, which was initiated and realized in practice by the USSR and the defensive military-political alliance of the Warsaw Pact. The Bucharest conference of the Political Consultative Committee will ensure that tomorrow is even clearer and brighter, it will guarantee peaceful competition in labor and calm for peoples throughout the world, and will concern itself with the security of the European and the world home.

#### **Soviet Tank Regiment Withdrawal From Poland Reported**

ACU0607123489

[Editorial Report] Sofia OTECHSTVEN FRONT in Bulgarian on 5 July on page 2 publishes a 1,000-word undated report by the newspaper's correspondent Ventseslav Karaivanov, datelined Warsaw and Strachow,

describing a trip arranged by the Polish Interpress Agency for Polish and foreign journalists to observe the ceremonial withdrawal of a Soviet tank training regiment from Strachow in Lower Silesia.

Karaivanov describes in detail the journey to the tank training ground, which he noted was now occupied by peaceful mushroom pickers, and then reports on the farewell parade held next morning before the last contingent of Soviet tanks and crews was shipped by rail to the Soviet border. He describes the warm farewell given to the Soviet troops by "representatives of the neighboring Polish military unit."

Karaivanov also reports on the news conference held after the parade by "representatives of the Public Committee for Observing the Reduction of Soviet Arms and Armed Forces," including the committee's deputy chairman, Sergey Rogov, from the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. According to Karaivanov, Rogov announced that "so far two training regiments had been withdrawn from Poland, and a missile regiment, a chemical warfare defense battalion, an armored personnel carrier battalion, and a helicopter regiment... were due to be withdrawn before the end of July." Karaivanov notes that, while answering questions, Rogov "devoted great attention to the sociopolitical consequences of the present reductions," with which his group was mainly concerned, particularly with finding new jobs and homes for the demobilized servicemen.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

**Bush Approach to Soviet Relations Criticized**  
AU0607165689 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak  
4 Jul 89 p 7

[Bedrich Zagar commentary: "Tied to the Past"]

[Text] At one of his recent White House news conferences, George Bush, American President, spoke about the topical issues of his administration's foreign and domestic policy. American journalists were mostly interested in Soviet-American relations, and the related question of another summit meeting between the most senior representatives of both countries. It arose from Bush's reply that the American President is not at all in a hurry to carry out a summit meeting, although he has been in the White House for almost 6 months. He said that he is satisfied with the development of relations and, in his opinion, the Soviet side is also satisfied. According to Bush, to hold a meeting at the highest level, detailed reciprocal consultations, an exchange of views, and thorough preparations are necessary to make the meeting productive and bring concrete results, although this does not have to be essential for the signing of new agreements.

Somehow, Bush does not know how to get rid of the hesitancy and exaggerated caution with which the American press has been reproaching him for a long time. The

biggest problem is, as one of the American journalists remarked, that "you do not find out anything from Bush that would interest the public." For example, the disarmament process cannot tolerate procrastination, why delay matters when after signing the Soviet-American agreement on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles, both sides, in the presence of Bush, agreed that this year an agreement should also be signed on a 50-percent reduction in strategic strike weapons. Further, regional conflict issues are unfinished and immediately require more impressive encouragement from the most authoritative statesmen of both superpowers.

In American foreign policy lobbies these days, people are mostly talking about whether or not Soviet restructuring will be successful, which is, according to some extragovernment politicians, also vital for the disarmament process. This is, understandably, only a delaying tactic with which conservative forces in Washington are trying to slow down disarmament and who claim that "the cold war" has still not come to an end. Confrontationist policy still continues to be implemented in support of these stances and it has to be said that from time to time the President himself succumbs to them.

In Washington two opinions prevail on the reforms to political and economic life in the Soviet Union: We must assist the intensification of glasnost and democratization in the USSR because this will also help the United States and the whole of the West. The other opinion again rejects support for Soviet restructuring because the Soviet Union would become an even stronger opponent of the United States. In essence both opinions are false ones. The first one welcomes restructuring and the reforms also associated with it in the other socialist countries in the hope that it will be able to intervene in these processes, as has already been proven by U.S. activity in Poland and Hungary (President Bush is to visit both countries) and the other opinion again endeavors to create the impression that the Soviet Union is only implementing its restructuring in order to become stronger militarily. The very opposite is the truth.

The essence of the new thinking is to give up any kind of military speculation because, with the existence of nuclear weapons, a war would mean collective annihilation and that would be stupid. Therefore, the American President should not succumb to such attitudes and not promise aid and other improvements to relations, including disarmament, only if the Soviet Union and other socialist states change their political orientation. The advice, which Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger are giving the President in this regard, is not constructive it could even be said that it could turn development back to the past, and it is not advisable to become tied to the past. If the United States does not

want to, it does not have to support economic reforms in socialist countries. But do not let that stand in their way or lay down political and ideological conditions and demands.

George Bush had the opportunity to see for himself what kind of popularity Mikhail Gorbachev has acquired in the United States, first and foremost, by his efforts to reverse the danger of nuclear war, for detente, and for the development of good relations between the East and the West. Similarly, the public in the FRG, during Mikhail Gorbachev's recent visit to this country, expressed their enthusiasm for and agreement with the policy of the most senior representative of the Soviet Union, for it is founded on sincere efforts to act in harmony with the interests of nations. If today they are reproaching George Bush at home because he lags behind Mikhail Gorbachev in popularity, it is thus necessary to seek the reason in his specific policy and in his efforts for the benefit of humanity and its survival in the next millenium without nuclear weapons and without wars at all.

#### **Commentaries View Gorbachev Proposals on Trip to France**

##### **RUDE PRAVO on Nuclear Disarmament**

LD0807092689 Prague CTK in English  
0617 GMT 8 Jul 89

[Text] Prague July 8 (CTK)—A new summit meeting of the Helsinki type, as proposed by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev during his visit to France, would bring about new cardinal stimuli and assets, RUDE PRAVO said on Saturday.

The Czechoslovak Communist Party daily said Europe of the end of the century will play an extremely important part in shaping its own destiny, as well as that of the whole world, and went on to stress that a Common European Home cannot be built without abandoning the trenches of Cold War in thinking and in politics. "The beginning of the construction of a common home means (or should mean) parting with Cold War. The same applies to the senseless accumulation of weapons in Europe, the need to reduce their numbers and eliminate nuclear weapons", the paper said. In this context, it added that France remains behind to a considerable extent in questions of disarmament, as the visit has shown.

##### **Western 'Split' on SNF Seen**

LD0707211689 Prague Domestic Service in Czech  
1630 GMT 7 Jul 89

[Text] One of the most frequently occurring themes of today's news agency reports is yesterday's speech by Mikhail Gorbachev at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. I set our foreign political commentator, Antonin Kostka, the difficult task of briefly analyzing reaction to the speech.

[Kostka] The strongest impressions seem to have been made by the announcement that the USSR will unilaterally cut its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe if NATO agrees to negotiations on these weapons—a unilateral cut in return for merely starting talks! This is such an unprecedented and, for the other side, attractive offer, that people who are still unable to contemplate international problems in new categories may find it suspicious. They fail to appreciate the full scale of the Soviet commitment to disarmament and tend to speculate, instead, that there must be some unknown ulterior motive behind it. In any case, the West is split into two camps in terms of its attitude to this Soviet offer. President Bush praised the offer, but added evasively that he didn't want to get off the track of the conventional disarmament talks already under way. A similar view was expressed by the official NATO spokesman.

The public, on the other hand, is full of enthusiasm for Gorbachev's offer, and it does not understand the restrained attitude of certain Western governments. After all, during the talks the West would retain its existing tactical weapons—only the balance of forces would improve in favor of the West, so why not get around the table? Is it only so as not to boost the prestige of the Soviet peace policy even further?

And what about the other issues addressed by Comrade Gorbachev? The reaction to these is, more or less, almost unequivocally positive, particularly with respect to the appeal to establish a common European economic and legal space [as heard], to cut military spending, and to hold a second Helsinki-type conference. The proposal to set up an all-European system of ecological security is also being received very positively—all the more so because the Soviet Union is willing to provide the material conditions for this, including satellites, scientific equipment, and staff.

In short, the thinking is that Mikhail Gorbachev's speech gave the common European home much more specific outlines.

##### **CSSR, GDR, FRG Discuss Chemical-Weapons-Free Zone**

LD0707222589 Prague CTK in English  
1830 GMT 7 Jul 89

[Text] Geneva July 7 (CTK)—The 14th round of the tripartite talks between Czechoslovakia and the two German states on the proposal to create a zone free of chemical weapons in Europe took place here today. The session was presided by Czechoslovak Ambassador Vratislav Vajnar.

The participants discussed a number of topical problems concerning talks on an international convention on a ban on chemical weapons and their liquidation, mainly the possibility of further practical verification of the already approved measures on control of chemical industry facilities.



## **FRG's Genscher Discusses Arms Issues With Foreign Minister Johanès**

### **NATO, Warsaw Pact Meetings Discussed**

*LD1207132489 Hamburg DPA in German  
1240 GMT 12 Jul 89*

[Text] Prague (DPA)—FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher began 2 days of consultations in Prague on Wednesday with a full exchange of views with his Czechoslovak counterpart Jaromir Johanès.

During the talk, Johanès briefed Genscher on the Warsaw Pact summit in Bucharest. Genscher told his host about NATO's ideas on conventional disarmament in Europe. Both sides welcomed the latest progress on disarmament.

The ministers devoted a lot of time to bilateral relations, joint efforts to improve the environment, and the expansion of economic, cultural and tourist contacts. Genscher urged the opening of a further frontier crossing-point near Waldsassen.

The subsequent talk with CSSR Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec was devoted primarily to bilateral issues, particularly environmental protection.

### **Further Details**

*LD1207152289 Prague CTK in English  
1358 GMT 12 Jul 89*

[Excerpts] Prague July 12 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jaromir Johanès met with his West German colleague Hans-Dietrich Genscher for a roughly 50-minute long tete-a-tete talk today.

Later on the two ministers continued talks in the presence of delegations, during which they exchanged views on the current state and possibilities of further development of Czechoslovak-West German relations. The ministers discussed in detail the present international situation.

Minister Genscher's visit to Czechoslovakia takes place in the framework of regular annual meetings of the foreign ministers of the two countries, provided for by the joint declaration signed during President Gustav Husak's visit to the FRG in April 1978. [passage omitted]

In an extensive exchange of opinions on the international situation, the two sides welcomed the improvement in East-West relations and the easing of tension in the world.

They spoke positively of developments in Europe, welcomed progress in implementing the conclusions of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting in the military, economic, ecological and humanitarian spheres. They noted

with satisfaction the development of bilateral cooperation in Europe, which they see as an important part of building a common European home. In this context the two ministers appreciated the results of the visit by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to the FRG.

They agreed that tangible results could be achieved in a relatively short time at the Vienna talks on conventional disarmament in Europe. Czechoslovakia and the FRG believe it is important to discuss the issue of military doctrines.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher informed his counterpart of the main results of the recent NATO summit meeting in Brussels, concerning East-West relations.

Briefing his guest about the results of the Bucharest meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political consultative committee, Jaromir Johanès said its participants welcomed some conclusions of the NATO session but at the same time he pointed out that the conclusions contain also certain elements that are out of tune with the requests of time. He underlined the need to settle the question of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe by opening independent talks, as proposed by the Warsaw Treaty states. Minister Johanès stressed the support given to Mikhail Gorbachev's proposals, presented in Strasbourg, by the Political Consultative Committee. He emphasized the importance of carrying out these proposals both for Czechoslovakia and the FRG, situated in the area of greatest concentration of weapons in the world. Minister Johanès also pointed out the topical character of Czechoslovak and GDR proposals for forming a corridor free of nuclear weapons and a zone free of chemical weapons in central Europe. [passage omitted]

### **CFE Ambassador Balcar Sees 'Positive Results' From Second Round**

*LD1307195789 Prague CTK in English  
1856 GMT 13 Jul 89*

[Text] Vienna July 13 (CTK correspondent)—The second round of disarmament talks of member states of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO on conventional weapons in Europe ended here today.

At today's session, the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) submitted a new proposal. Head of the Soviet delegation Oleg Grinevskiy pointed out at a press conference that these are the same proposals which have been heard at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels, only worked out with more details.

"Due to intensive and matter-of-fact work during the whole second round of talks, we have succeeded in getting the attitudes concerning a number of issues considerably closer to each other", head of the Czechoslovak delegation Ladislav Balcar told CTK.

The positive results of the session are represented by the fact that the agenda of the talks at present includes six categories of conventional armed forces, i.e. basic forces for unexpected attacks, that the structure of a future agreement has been outlined and an effective working mechanism has been created, Ladislav Balcar said.

The fact that at least at the end of the second round, the NATO countries have succeeded in submitting elaborated attitudes concerning the issues of troops, aircraft and helicopters. [sentence as received] Had these attitudes—in the form of proposals—been submitted at the beginning of the talks, as the Warsaw Treaty member states have done, the talks could have proceeded even further, head of the Czechoslovak delegation Ladislav Balcar said.

## GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

### Disarmament Conference Resumes 4 Jul in Geneva

**GDR Delegate Addresses UN Course**  
AU0507185489 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND  
in German 4 Jul 89 p 1

[ADN report: "GDR Attaches Utmost Importance to Disarmament Questions: Head of Delegation to Geneva Addressed UN Course"]

[Text] Geneva (ADN)—Disarmament is the most direct and effective way to guarantee mankind's security and survival in the nuclear and cosmic age. Therefore, the GDR attaches utmost importance to disarmament questions, Ambassador Dr Peter Dietze, head of the GDR delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, stated at the opening of a UN disarmament course in Geneva on Monday [3 July].

A continuous increase in military spendings especially while the developing countries are facing great economic and social problems, contradicts any human reason. Disarmament makes it possible to prevent the militarization of international life, to build confidence, and to reduce hostilities. The GDR's great commitment to disarmament and peace is due to historical experiences and its geographical position, Ambassador Dr Dietze said. At the dividing line between the two strongest military alliances, it is consistently struggling so that an armed conflict will never again start from German soil.

**Proposal on ASAT Weapons Ban**  
AU0607123789 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND  
in German 5 July 89 p 1

[ADN report: "GDR Proposal on Banning Antisatellite Weapons"]

[Text] Geneva (ADN)—On Tuesday [4 July] the GDR presented a proposal on banning of antisatellite (ASAT) weapons at the Geneva disarmament conference. It

supplements a 1987 joint initiative of the GDR and the Mongolian Peoples' Republic, with which both states presented to the conference the basic elements of a treaty on banning ASAT weapons and ways of guaranteeing the immunity of objects in space.

The document "Components of ASAT Weapons and Ways to Verify Their Ban" deals with problems of defining and categorizing ASAT weapons and shows possibilities for an effective verification of future treaties. It proceeds from the premise that technical development is most highly advanced concerning so-called conventional ASAT weapons and that therefore their ban is particularly urgent, Ambassador Peter Dietze explained at the plenary session.

With the ideas that were presented the discussion about space weapons or components, about a ban of these weapons, and about its verification could be advanced. For 8 years preventing the arms race in space has been on the agenda of the conference, Ambassador Dietze recalled. Many proposals are on the table. Now it is time to deal with the matter no matter what obstacles there might be.

### Editorial Calls NATO Reaction to Pact Proposals 'Unsatisfactory'

AU1007133089 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND  
in German 7 Jul 89 p 2

[Editorial by "He": "What Is NATO's Reaction?"]

[Text] The number, realism, and urgency of the disarmament proposals submitted by the Warsaw Pact states are clearly evident, writes our reader Wolfgang Fichtel from Dresden. He asks: What is NATO's reaction?

To put it directly: unsatisfactory. Regarding Vienna, for instance, where our proposals on a radical reduction in conventional forces and arms have been on the table for months, the NATO leadership has promised to present a response or a concept of its own by the fall at the earliest. NATO has rejected our proposal to simultaneously negotiate on tactical nuclear weapons, arguing—and this is interesting—that definitive results must be reached in Vienna first.

Regarding the halving of strategic offensive weapons, the United States entrenches itself behind the verification issue at the negotiations with the USSR in Geneva. It also keeps putting up new obstacles on the road to the discontinuation of nuclear tests and a worldwide ban on chemical weapons.

So, is NATO doing nothing? That is not entirely correct. NATO is even doing quite a lot—however, regrettably in the wrong direction. As if the Warsaw Pact states had never submitted their proposals, and as if they had not made any unilateral concessions regarding the decrease of their military budgets, NATO demands that its members increase their military spending by 3 percent. U.S.

General Chief-of-Staff Admiral Crowe intends to adjust the number of tanks and artillery systems in West Europe "to a given situation"—upward, of course. The number of NATO bombers increased from 5,000 in May to 5,400 in June; it will be "increased by several hundred more" in July.

Regarding tactical nuclear weapons, NATO does not seek to abolish, but to "modernize" them. U.S. Secretary of State Baker: "Even with conventional parity, our nuclear weapons will play a unique role (!) in our strategy." Unfortunately, we could add any number of examples to this chain. In addition, we are always confronted with their dogged insistence on the strategy of nuclear "deterrence" and with new steps of stepped-up armament.

So, quite obviously, influential forces within NATO fully put on the brakes. Two conclusions offer themselves: In keeping with the will of all peoples, we must intensify our efforts to advance the disarmament process. We also must remain vigilant—vigilant and ready for defense.

#### **Paper Condemns U.S. Response to Gorbachev Strasbourg Proposals**

LD0807092289 East Berlin ADN International Service  
in German 0127 GMT 8 Jul 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The GDR youth paper "JUNGE WELT" writes this weekend about the negative response from Washington to the disarmament proposals contained in Mikhail Gorbachev's speech in Strasbourg. The paper writes: "President Bush simply rejected the initiative. What does this make clear? In the first place, that the arms lobby is applying the brake on disarmament because profitable business deals could run into danger. Secondly, that the United States is not prepared to renounce its world domination plans. And finally, thirdly, it again confirms that the administration would like, as before, to limit a military conflict to Europe, because the short-range missiles under discussion only make sense on our continent, on the border between the two social systems.

\* They are still playing with fire in Washington then. Once again, the outstretched hand has been refused. That the new thinking is not patented has been wilfully ignored".

#### **FRG Military Budget Seen as 'Incompatible' With Disarmament**

AU1107121989 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND  
in German 8-9 Jul 89 p 2

[Editorial by "W.M.": "Bonn—Words and Deeds"]

[Text] As was decided by the Bonn cabinet this week, the FRG military budget will be increased by DM1.7 billion in 1990. The largest increase in the total budget for stepping up armament is in contrast to recent statements by Bonn politicians that they intend to work for progress in disarmament.

Words and deeds—the budget shows that Bonn puts its stakes on stepped-up armament: even though the proposals of the Warsaw Pact states on a drastic reduction in conventional forces and arms are on the negotiating table; even though Mikhail Gorbachev in Strasbourg recently offered further reductions in Soviet tactical missiles, if simultaneous negotiations were to be resumed on tactical nuclear weapons; even though the USSR, the GDR, and other socialist states are already carrying out significant unilateral concessions, making disarmament steps, and reducing their military spending.

What will the billions of Deutsche marks in Bonn's military budget be spent on? Several days ago, the Bundestag gave the go-ahead for new military projects. These are four frigates of the "F 123" type, which will be commissioned in the years 1991 to 1996, and 75 additional tanks of the "Leopard II" type. Thus the number of this offensive weapon type that the Bundeswehr will have will be increased from 1,942 to 2,017. The FRG Army has a total of 5,100 tanks now, 200 more than last year; and let us not forget the biggest arms project, the "Fighter 90," which was also decided on this year.

It is remarkable that the FRG spends its billions of Deutsche marks for definitely offensive weapons and, regarding ships and aircraft, for weapon categories in which NATO is now considerably superior. That is absolutely incompatible with the intention stated in the NATO summit report to push "as a matter of prime importance the elimination of the ability to launch surprise attacks and to start large-scale offensive acts."

With the additional DM1.7 billion, the FRG's military budget will be increased to DM54.47 billion. The growth rate is much higher than the 3 percent annually that Washington has demanded of its partners. Most of them had rejected the 3 percent, not least because of the aggravation of social conflicts that such high military burdens are bound to create. However, Bonn is the top boy once again. The Federal citizens will experience what that means.

#### **SED'S Axen Meets Bavarian SPD Official**

##### **Discuss Tactical Nuclear Arms**

LD1107085689 East Berlin ADN International Service  
in German 1533 GMT 10 Jul 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Hermann Axen, member of the Politburo and secretary of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] Central Committee, and Karl-Heinz Hiersemann, member of the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] party executive, chairman of the Social Democrat parliamentary group in the Bavarian regional parliament and chairman of the SPD area of Franken, reaffirmed the joint responsibility of the two German states for safeguarding peace and continuing the



disarmament and detente process today in Berlin. During the frank exchange of opinion on current international questions, as well as on the relations between the GDR and the FRG, the two politicians agreed that the peace and detente policy is the prerequisite for developing good-neighbourly relations in Europe.

Hermann Axen and Karl-Heinz Hiersemann stated unanimously that it is now necessary for disarmament efforts to continue dynamically on all levels. They acknowledged the progress achieved in nuclear disarmament with the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles as well as the start of negotiations on conventional disarmament in Vienna and on further confidence- and security- building measures in Europe. They welcomed the most recent statement by the political consultative committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states as a suitable basis for further progress in disarmament, detente and cooperation. The proposal by the U.S. President for a reduction in conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe is a step in the right direction.

Negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons with the aim of further zero-options are imperative for the successful continuation of the disarmament process. The two interlocutors expressed confidence that, with the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, conditions are being created which positively affect a further improvement of the situation on the European continent.

Hermann Axen stressed that the year 1989, which is the 50th anniversary of the beginning of World War II, is a special reason for the Socialist German state to see to it that never again war, but only peace, emanates from German soil. This historical legacy justifies antifascism as well as the peace policy as the GDR state doctrine. Neo-Nazism and xenophobia can not be reconciled with peace and joint security. They called for the vigilance of the international community and of all peace-loving and democratic forces.

Hermann Axen and Karl-Heinz Hiersemann acknowledged the relations between the GDR and the FRG which are developing as a result of the visit by Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State to the FRG in September 1987. Relations between the GDR and Bavaria had also developed positively in the economy, scientific-technological cooperation and environmental protection. They spoke in favor of expanding cooperation and dialogue.

The two interlocutors stressed that the possibilities for forming of good-neighbour relations between the GDR and the FRG were good if both sides allowed themselves to be guided by a respect for sovereignty, inviolability of

frontiers, territorial integrity, equality and noninterference, realism, and good will. There was agreement on the necessity of establishing the course of the Elbe frontier and disbanding the Salzgitter registration office.

For the SED, the following took part in the talks: Hans-Georg Schuster, deputy department head in the SED Central Committee; and Karl Seidel, head of the FRG department in the GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accompanying Karl-Hienz Hiersemann were Bavarian regional parliament members, Rolf Langenberger, deputy chairman of the SPD parliamentary group, Bernd Hering, Klaudia Martini and Otto Schumann.

On the same day Karl-Heinz Hiersemann and his entourage took part in a seminar on security policy with representatives of the GDR Institute for International Politics and Economy and of the Council for Peace Research.

#### **Hiersemann Gives News Conference**

*LD1107091889 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1817 GMT 10 Jul 89*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The continuing dialogue between the SPD and the SED in the interest of real steps in disarmament of the SPD party executive and chairman of the Social Democratic parliamentary group in the Bavarian regional parliament, as the main concern of his third official visit to the GDR. At a press conference in Berlin today, he said that his party hoped that the FRG would be the driving force in the NATO alliance on matters of disarmament and detente.

We know, Hiersemann said, that similar efforts are being made in their area by the GDR. He recalled a comment by Erich Honecker during an earlier talk that the two German states have the obligation, in view of their common history, to make the peace between them more secure.

The SPD politician reported that security and detente had played a central role in his talks. There had been agreement in evaluating the recent NATO summit as a step in the right direction. Like the GDR, however, his party advocated negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons with the goal of achieving a third-zero option. Both sides also shared the fundamental interest in scrapping battlefield nuclear weapons. The SPD was strongly opposed to the stationing of new nuclear weapons in the FRG. "What is falsely referred to as 'modernization' has no part in our policies," Hiersemann said. The Lance missiles must disappear from FRG territory. Further topics of discussion were cooperation on the environment and in trade, as well as town twinnings. His talks planned for the next few days in the Cottbus and Gera Bezirks are to promote the SPD-SED dialogue at the territorial level also.

Questioned on the advance of the neo-Nazi "Republicans" in the FRG, Karl-Heinz Hiersemann said that the SPD was very concerned about this. It would use all the means at its disposal to fight this indubitably right-wing extremist party. It was in the process of working out a concept to this end. Hiersemann condemned, in this connection, the comments by CDU [Christian Democratic Union] Finance Minister Waigel on an allegedly legal continued existence of the German Reich within the 1937 border. He could only warn against pursuing such a path. It would pave the way for a further growth of right-wing radicalism.

The SPD politician stated further that there had also been discussion of the problem of low-flying aircraft. In his view, structural nonaggression capability implied an end to low altitude flying in the GDR and in the FRG. He had advocated including in international negotiations the question of ending low-altitude flying.

#### **CSBM Envoy Buehring: 'Substantial Differences' Remain**

*AU1307085689 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 12 Jul 89 p 5*

[ADN report: "Rapprochement of Participants' Positions Taking Shape"]

[Text] Vienna—Ambassador Guenter Buehring, GDR envoy to the Vienna negotiations on new security and confidence-building measures in Europe, stressed that an initial rapprochement of the participants' positions is taking shape in the discussion. He said that this is particularly true for the improvement and expansion of the measures agreed in the Stockholm document.

However, there are still substantial differences regarding other problems, he said. For example, NATO doggedly refuses to negotiate on the expansion of security and confidence-building measures to include the navies, even though neutral states such as Sweden and Finland have stated that the Stockholm document, calling for the announcement and observation of amphibious exercises, shows the beginnings of a "naval component."

Ambassador Buehring said he expects the NATO states to give up their opposition to the inclusion of separate naval exercises in a system of announcement and observation. He said that "due to its exposed situation, the GDR in particular has a special interest in having the confidence-building measures not exclude the navies' separate, large-scale exercises."

Answering a question about the main problem of reaching agreement in Vienna, he said that the Stockholm document has undoubtedly proved its worth. He added that it would also be possible to reach agreement relatively quickly on improving some points in it, such as the rights of maneuvers observers, rules regarding inspections or inspectors, or the parameters for announcements and observations. However, he said, the question

is whether more security and confidence are really created in this way. "The Warsaw Pact states think that a new quality in the measures is required, a quality that is not confined to a process of getting used to a number of selective measures to disclose things and make them clearer, while maintaining a high level of military activity, but a quality that meets higher requirements. What they want is to considerably reduce and limit military activities in Europe, and in this way to effectively complement the planned drastic reduction of conventional forces."

According to the GDR representative, a point of emphasis at the beginning of the next round of talks in September will be the earliest possible successful conclusion of the work of the ad hoc group for the preparation of a seminar on military doctrines, which would have a favorable influence on the negotiations on conventional disarmament and new security and confidence-building measures. In addition, Buehring said, it will be important to give the work of the 35 CSCE states even more dynamism.

#### **HUNGARY**

#### **CFE Delegate Presents 'Detailed Data' on Hungarian Forces**

*LD0507084589 Budapest MTI in English 1553 GMT 4 Jul 89*

[Text] Vienna, July 4 (MTI)—Istvan Gyarmati, deputy head of the Hungarian delegation, addressed the Vienna talks in progress on the reduction of European conventional weapons. Mr Gyarmati presented detailed data to the negotiating partners on a major part of the Hungarian armed forces, the armoured troops, their structure and battle order, positions, and the number of soldiers in service.

Mr Gyarmati recalled that in the course of the talks, the Hungarian delegation has from the very first taken an active stand for the 23 countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO to make data on their armed forces available in the interest of military openness and the progress of the talks. Almost all negotiating sides received this with agreement, however, no single delegation has so far taken concrete steps to present data related to their battle order.

This Hungarian initiative can accelerate working out the agreement, as it makes concrete and also further develops the debate held so far on arms systems to be included in the reduction and restriction. Should there be response, it would help create agreement which is indispensable for the verification of the agreement.

The Hungarian step, which is in harmony with the comprehensive proposal of the Warsaw Treaty member state submitted at the start of the talks, was favourably evaluated at Tuesday's session by representatives of the Polish, British and Canadian delegations addressing the meeting.



**Proposal to Disarmament Conference for Radiological Weapons Ban**

*LD0607170289 Budapest MTI in English  
1059 GMT 6 Jul 89*

[Text] Geneva, July 6 (MTI)—The Hungarian delegation has submitted a proposal in Geneva on the complete ban of radiological weapons and a ban on attacks against nuclear facilities.

At the Thursday session of the Disarmament Conference, Ambassador Istvan Varga, leader of the Hungarian delegation, noted that the results attained in the field of political cooperation, particularly in Europe, should be supported by major disarmament agreements. Although radiological weapons do not as yet exist, the prevention of their appearance would serve to create and intensify confidence.

As a result of the talks that have been in progress for quite some time, extensive agreement is emerging with respect to certain details.

The Hungarian proposal, which strives to pave the way for further progress starting from the summarization of results so far, relies on this.

**Military Flights Limited, Armored Brigade Demobilized**

*LD0607190789 Budapest MTI in English  
1659 GMT 6 Jul 89*

[Text] Budapest, July 6 (MTI)—Two Hungarian regular soldiers will also take part in the European conference of the organization of conscripts, officials of the Ministry of Defence told the press in Budapest on Thursday. Founded ten years ago, the West European organization invited Hungarian and Soviet observers to its conference to be held in Finland late July. The soldiers are to inform participants of the life of conscripts in the Hungarian People's Army.

Concerning military flights, Major General Istvan Schmidt, chief of the Air Force, held it important from the aspect of noise abatement to consider the population's complaints. Therefore, the ministry has taken comprehensive measures to limit flights in time, space, and height. The flight time of units was reduced to 2.5 days a week, and flights were banned on holidays and from 23 p.m. to 6 a.m. on weekdays. The airports can only be used for take-off and landing but not for manoeuvres. Flights have been banned over holiday resorts and supersonic flights are only permitted above 12,000 metres. Further restrictions are conditional on the eventual agreements between the two military blocs on the mutual reduction of armed forces. In reply to a question, it was announced that Hungarian restrictions were accepted by the Soviet minister of defence and also apply to Soviet air units.

As the first step of implementing the unilateral cut in Hungarian troops and armament announced early this year, an armoured brigade stationed between the Danube and Tisza rivers is to be demobilized in August.

**POLAND**

**Bush Views on Soviet Troop Withdrawals Panned**

*AU1007135789 Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 7 Jul 89 p 2*

[Commentary by Lieutenant Colonel Andrzej Fryszkiewicz: "A Double Standard"]

[Text] It was to be expected that the interview that George Bush gave to the Polish press—on the eve of his official visit to our country—would arouse understandable interest on the part of political circles and public opinion in a broad sense. The U.S. President's position on issues as important as peace on our continent or his vision of "a common European home" cannot be matters of indifference to the world. That is why leading analysts and commentators studied every part of the President's statement with great care. The President made numerous references to the military status quo in Europe, which was of particular interest to military commentators. One response was the statement made by Vladimir Chernyshev, the TASS military commentator.

The journalist accurately appraised George Bush's intentions concerning the demilitarization of Europe, which he referred to as "wishes couched in double standards" Chernyshev does not conceal his surprise at the fact that the U.S. President "artificially removes the security problem of the country that he will visit from the broader context of maintaining the Warsaw Pact's defensive capability." He asks a very straightforward question: If Bush believes that there is no threat to peace in Europe, then why does he not propose the complete withdrawal of American forces from the FRG, and why does he not mention this as a possibility in relation to the French forces, or the British forces on the Rhine. This would be useful from every angle, and it would be an encouraging move, and—at a time when the USSR has started on the planned withdrawal of further military units stationed in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Poland—would furnish material proof of the nature of his intentions.

In his commentary, the TASS journalist stresses that the U.S. President employs dual vision with respect to this problem. The mechanism is relatively simple. The President's interview clearly indicates that George Bush does not consider the presence of Soviet forces in Poland—one can assume that this also applies to their presence in other Warsaw Pact states—within the context of European security. He considers these things in isolation and in a way that would suggest that the Soviet Union has not done anything at all so far to reduce its defensive

strength in Europe. However, almost every day now we witness very concrete facts and not just declarations, and this also applies to our country.

Moreover, Vladimir Chernyshev's critical observations are fully convergent with our own position on disarmament. This was reflected in what Zbigniew Broniarek had to say in TRYBUNA LUDU in the commentary that he wrote shortly after the interview, which he also took part in. TRYBUNA LUDU's Washington correspondent noted that George Bush spoke "more than spontaneously" about the call for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland. The TRYBUNA LUDU journalist also asks questions about the President's dual approach and his inconsistency, noting that the President continues to use terms such as "enormous superiority," which Western military experts and negotiators have long since removed from their vocabulary.

Thus, viewed in very general terms, in many commentaries, including the one by Vladimir Chernyshev, one can detect a call for the abandonment of spontaneity and superfluous emotion in favor of hard facts and goodwill.

#### **Soviet CW Defense Battalion Leaves Wroclaw Kozanow**

*LD1007193189 Warsaw Television Service in Polish  
1730 GMT 10 Jul 89*

[Excerpts] Already the third unit forming part of the northern group of the forces of the Soviet army has been withdrawn. At Wroclaw Kozanow a ceremonial farewell of the Soviet independent chemical warfare defense battalion took place. [passage omitted] The column of Soviet vehicles left the town at 1000.

### **ROMANIA**

#### **SCINTEIA Commentary on Warsaw Pact Summit Meeting**

*AU1107173189 Bucharest AGERPRES in English  
1445 GMT 11 Jul 89*

["Under the Sign of Strengthening Collaboration in Socialist Construction, in the Struggle for Peace and Disarmament, of the Determination To Firmly Reject Any Destablizing Tendencies of Interference in Home Affairs—Article in SCINTEIA of 11 July"—AGERPRES headline]

[Excerpts] Bucharest, AGERPRES, 11/7/1989—In Bucharest, where more than twenty years ago, at a meeting of the Warsaw Treaty socialist countries, the idea of security and cooperation in Europe had been first advocated to be later materialized by a string of highly important and significant reunions and understandings which led to the convening of the all-European Conference and the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, another political action arrests the attention of the international public opinion: The representatives at top level of the Warsaw Treaty states signed the document "For a Stable

and Secure Europe, Free of Nuclear and Chemical Arms, For a Substantial Reduction of Armed Forces, Armaments and Military Spending". This document as well as the released communique synthesize the joint conclusions and positions of the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty states after the exchange of views on the international situation and the main action lines to strengthen peace and stability in Europe and the world over, to achieve disarmament, broaden international collaboration and dialogue. Naturally, the meeting participants attached special importance to problems of the construction of new system, of socioeconomic collaboration during the view exchange.

Considering the importance of the problems approached, of the documents endorsed, President Nicolae Ceausescu showed in the speech at the dinner in honour of the participants that "one may say that—in general—the meeting is a moment of utmost importance for future collaboration, both internationally and in socialist construction in our countries".

In Bucharest declaration of the Warsaw Treaty states starts from facts in the contemporary world, from the general aspirations at securing a lasting security in Europe, at making new steps along the disarmament path, at putting international relations on new bases and reiterates the necessity of strengthening peace, freeing mankind of the war danger, of developing a broad mutually advantageous collaboration among all countries.

Throwing light on their determination to concentrate their efforts on building the socialist society, the participating states also stressed that the cardinal issues today are the cessation of the arms race, the liquidation of nuclear and chemical arms, the radical reduction of conventional arms, which requires stepped up efforts from all peace-loving forces working to safeguard life and civilization.

Particularly, the declaration restates that a new policy of security, understanding and interstate collaboration should be firmly promoted by strictly observing national independence and sovereignty, equality and mutual advantage, all peoples' imprescriptible right to choose freely their socio-political development path, with no interference in home affairs and excluding completely the threat and use of force. The declaration shows that the participating states are ready to develop and deepen, on this basis, the dialogue with all states, to collaborate constructively to solve the problems facing mankind, to consolidate security and ensure stability on the continent and the world over. The differences of social system, the declaration points out, should not be an obstacle in the path of mutual collaboration and understanding among states.

It is an essential principle of the international life which acquires a greater significance in the light of more and more intense attempts lately to interfere in the socialist countries' home affairs, with the obvious aim to destabilize the situation in these countries, to envenom the political climate in Europe and the rest of the world. The so-called thesis of "European reconciliations" is used as a pretext for the resurgence [word as received] of the antisocialist and anticommunist policies pursued by political circles in Western states, the USA included, which downrightly resort to inadmissible practices of interference in other states' home affairs. Most serious is the fact that the champions of such attempts are personalities in the highest offices in some of these countries, to give these the weight of state policies. [passage omitted]

The constructive positions and proposals, the conclusions of the Bucharest meeting go down as an event of international political importance, as a great contribution to the promotion of the cause of socialism and peace.

Public opinion in Romania, the Romanian people welcome the results of the meeting, the signature of President Nicolae Ceausescu on the declaration being the supreme guarantee that Romania, alongside the other socialist states, the advanced peoples and forces everywhere will work firmly and consistently for disarmament and peace, for the attainment of the great desideratum of the people in the continent to live in a united Europe of free and independent states, in a better and more just world.

#### **Ceausescu Comments on European Force Reductions**

AU0607125789 Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian  
30 Jul 89 pp 1, 7

["Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's Interview With the Algerian Magazine REVOLUTION AFRICAINE" granted in Bucharest on 22 June]

[Excerpts] As has been reported, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, secretary general of the Romanian Communist Party [RCP] and president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, on 22 June received Larab Mohamed and Lazhari Labter, special envoys of the magazine REVOLUTION AFRICAINE, the central organ of the National Liberation Front of Algeria, to whom he granted the following interview: [passage omitted]

Question: Mr President, Romania, a member country of the Warsaw Pact, has unilaterally decided to reduce military expenditure, arms, and troops by 5 percent. We would like to know your view on the elimination of nuclear weapons from Europe and on the process of disarmament and security on this continent.

Answer: I have already mentioned that throughout the years we have not increased, but have gradually reduced military expenditure, and 3 years ago we decided to go

over to a 5-percent cut in troops. We made this decision for economic reasons, but also for political ones. We wanted to set an example regarding the need to go over—even unilaterally—to a reduction in military expenditure.

As is known, many socialist countries have unilaterally gone over to measures aimed at reducing their troops and military expenditure. The Soviet Union has also announced a unilateral reduction, involving an important number of troops and weapons. We think that all this is very important for the process of security and cooperation in Europe and for developing the policy of peace and cooperation in the world in general.

Despite all this, it is known that after the accord between the Soviet Union and the United States on reducing intermediate-range nuclear missiles, things did not make any headway, but in a way one can talk of regress. I am saying this on the basis of the fact that the NATO countries insist on modernizing the intermediate-range nuclear missiles which, in accordance with their own statements, would mean a four-fold increase in their destructive power. Actually, this would not only cancel out the effects of the cuts in intermediate-range nuclear missiles, but would even create an additional force, thus increasing the threat of the world's nuclear destruction. Nuclear testing continues. The process of militarizing outer space continues through the implementation of the U.S. program, which will inevitably prompt the Soviet Union to take appropriate measures.

This is why we believe that everything must be done to completely eliminate shorter-range and tactical nuclear weapons, to ensure that an accord on a 50-percent reduction of conventional weapons be concluded, that all states stop nuclear testing, that the militarization of outer space be renounced, and that appropriate agreements be concluded on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. We believe that this problem does not only concern the Soviet Union and the United States, and not only the nuclear states, but all states in the world, because the effects of the use of nuclear weapons will be felt by the whole of mankind. Therefore, all countries on all continents are interested in the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and should actively participate in ensuring the best possible living conditions on our planet.

We also advocate the implementation of the conventional disarmament program and participate actively in these negotiations, determined to do all we can to contribute to the achievement of appropriate agreements before the end of this year. We advocate an at least 50-percent cut in these weapons, troops, and military expenditure, under appropriate international control. At the same time, we believe it is necessary for all states to work not toward accumulating new weapons of any kind, but toward moving to a world program of disarmament, toward eliminating chemical weapons, and toward reducing conventional weapons to no more than is



necessary. Certainly, each country has the right to possess the weapons it needs for defense. We hope that—eventually—we will build a world without wars, hence without weapons. We know that this is an old wish of mankind, a noble wish, and we would like it to come true in the shortest time possible!

**Question:** In many of your speeches you introduced this new idea of a "united Europe." Mr President, would you please discuss this proposal of yours?

**Answer:** Romania firmly advocates relations of broad cooperation with all states in the world. We support regional understandings among various countries—like, for instance, the OAU—which should ensure broader cooperation among states to ensure their socioeconomic development.

In establishing such relations, we proceed from the need for full equality of rights among states, respect for national independence and sovereignty, noninterference in domestic affairs, and from each people's right to organize its life and to live in the social system, which it deems as being the most appropriate for its aspirations for progress and well-being.

In this spirit, we are for broad cooperation in Europe. We are for the abolition of the division of Europe into military blocs—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—which implies their simultaneous dismantling; we are also for the renunciation of the division of the European countries into economic organizations on the basis of active cooperation between the Common Market and CEMA, in order to gradually eliminate the present obstacles.

We believe that, in achieving the goal of security in Europe, we should start from a united Europe of free and independent nations. We oppose the establishment of supranational bodies—and we believe this thesis is wrong!—because this would not ensure a Europe of free and independent peoples, but would turn it, in one form or another and sooner or later, into a continent of peoples lacking freedom, where the aspirations of each people and each nation would disappear. We advocate a Europe united in its diversity of social systems, where free and independent states are preserved, a Europe united in its socioeconomic, scientific, and cultural development, and a Europe of peace and equal cooperation with other world nations. [passage omitted]

#### **SCINTEIA Comments on Nuclear Deterrence Policy**

AU0607193889 Bucharest AGERPRES in English  
1800 GMT 6 Jul 89

["A Pressing Demand for the Ensurance of Peace: Renunciation of the Nuclear Deterrence Policy—Excerpted Commentary in the Romanian Newspaper SCINTEIA of 6 July"—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES 6/7/1989—In a speech at the recent plenum of the CC [Central Committee] of the RCP [Romanian Communist Party], Nicolae Ceausescu,

stressing that with the relative balance of forces achieved on a world plane as a result of which world peace has been maintained for nearly 45 years, a number of difficulties could be overcome and progress could have been made in the negotiated settlement of several pressing problems, showed that nonetheless the international situation continued to be particularly grave and complex.

This assessment is based first of all on the continuing arms race, on the large quantities of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and of conventional weapons in the world's arsenals, this tremendous accumulation of military means being a serious threat to peace and, in the event that nuclear arms are used, to life itself on this planet.

Unfortunately, facts show that militaristic circles will not face reality, will not accept something that cannot be shunned, namely that the development of nuclear weapons call for a sharp change of past political thinking, for a new approach to international issues for a complete renunciation of force and the military doctrines that rely on the use of force. Paradoxically, while acknowledging the danger of nuclear destruction, political and military leaders in certain NATO countries continue their attempts to make their idea—that it was precisely the nuclear weapons that would have safeguarded peace until now and therefore would be a guarantee for the future—gain ground and even prove it (which is impossible). This idea is the essence of the very "nuclear deterrence" theory or doctrine.

However, a closer analysis clearly shows how shaky this theory is precisely because it is founded on terror, and any peace rested on the "balance of terror" can only be uncertain. Time and again did the president of Romania say that as long as nuclear arms are maintained, the threat of a nuclear war with all its unpredictable consequences remains.

That the "nuclear deterrence" strategy is the strongest promoter of the nuclear armaments race, is shown by the current projects of the Atlantic Alliance to modernize its short range and strategic missiles, as the process of militarization of space continues and nuclear tests are going on.

The "modernization" process concerns first of all the short range missiles stationed in Europe that has just been ridded of medium-range missiles as a result of the Soviet-American accord. But, as President Nicolae Ceausescu told the press, not only would the proposed modernization virtually offset the effects of scrapping intermediate-range missiles but it would create an extra force, hence compounding the danger of a world disaster.

By virtue of the same obsolete outlook modernization also refers to strategic nuclear arsenals so as to make like weapons ever harder to be detected and destroyed. It is

easy to reach the conclusion that such an improvement does by no means help "deterrence" from an attack but increases the temptation for a "devastating first strike."

Moreover, one cannot disconsider another essential aspect: Even if they were not used, owing to their "global" range of action, strategic nuclear weapons acquire the character of "global" weapons of politically blackmailing the countries that do not hold like armament.

One must in no way exclude the possibility of an accident, of a misinterpretation by the automatic warning systems or of irresponsible acts which, all in all, mean tremendous risks.

In other words, the developments in the arms race prove that the factor of "restraint" stops working, stops being operational, the "myth of nuclear deterrence," of "guaranteed mutual destruction" is dispelled and the nightmare of a nuclear war tends to turn from a mere hypothesis into a forthcoming and terrifying reality: Thinking it has acquired a deciding superiority, one of the sides can burst "the beginning of the end."

Given such a complete inconsistency and aberrant character of the theories of "deterrence" and "balance of terror," Romania has shown more than once that the only actually realistic way, the role alternative to a nuclear disaster is nuclear disarmament. Under such circumstances, President Nicolae Ceausescu stated, the renunciation of nuclear weapons and of the programmes for their modernization, and the achievement of new accords between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on a 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear missiles as well as of a general agreement on the liquidation of any nuclear weapons are fundamental problems of the international life.

To be on the brink of a nuclear precipice has never been and the less can it be in future a reliable means to guarantee security as it has always meant tremendous risks. The lofty interests of mankind's survival call for acknowledgement of the great risks the theory of deterrence implies, as Romania maintains alongside all the advanced consciences, as well as of the need to abolish it without delay by giving up nuclear armament so that the nightmare of guaranteed mutual destruction be replaced by relations of understanding, security and mutual confidence among states based on common sense of responsibility for the fate of mankind.

## INDIA

**Spokesman on Government Chemical Exports Policy**  
*BK1107164489 Delhi Doordarshan Television Network  
in English 1600 GMT 11 Jul 89*

[Text] India was working toward a comprehensive treaty which would lead to a ban on chemical weapons. At the same time, India is against a partial ban or any ad hoc arrangement for banning the export of chemicals, as it would be discriminatory and may hurt our chemical industry. This was stated in New Delhi today by an official spokesman. He noted that the U.S. was appreciative of India's role in the Paris talks on chemical weapons.

Answering questions on the return of a ship carrying thionyl chloride exported by an Indian firm, the spokesman clarified that the government was not involved at all as there was no ban on the export of this chemical in India.

## PAKISTAN

**Country 'Would Be Helpless' Against Indian Missile Attack**

*BK0207122889 Hong Kong AFP in English  
1215 GMT 2 Jul 89*

[Text] Karachi, Pakistan, July 2 (AFP)—Pakistan would be helpless against a Indian missile attack, Minister of State for Defence Ghulam Sarwar Cheema has warned, while criticizing New Delhi's "hegemonistic designs."

"We do not have the necessary antidote to combat a missile attack," the minister admitted when asked about Pakistan's preparedness against neighboring India's recently tested "Agni" intermediate-range ballistic missile.

Mr. Cheema told businessmen at the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry Saturday that special radar and anti-missile systems required for effective defence against a missile attack were "prohibitively expensive."

He added that the Pakistani Government was cognizant of the matter and was doing everything possible "within our economic constraints" to evolve an effective defence system.

The minister said that the successful testing by India last month of the "Agni" revealed New Delhi's "hegemonistic designs" in the region.

India wanted to "control an area stretching from Australia and New Zealand up to Suez in west Asia," Mr. Cheema said. Pakistan has fought three wars with India since 1947.

He said that the government was for the first time considering private sector participation in defence production.

The minister called upon the Pakistani business community to come forward with proposals for starting joint ventures with the Defence Ministry for manufacturing defence equipment.

Mr. Cheema assured businessmen of a guaranteed market for their products, adding that the government would also help them in acquiring technology transfer and export of defence production.

Yunus Bandukda, president of the Karachi chamber, welcomed the government offer and said the private sector would keenly look forward to such prospects.

Mr. Cheema told the National Assembly Thursday that Pakistan would try to acquire a missile similar to India's. Islamabad has already test fired two missiles, one with a range of 300 kilometers (180 miles).

But he also warned that the "Agni"—with a maximum expected range of 2,500 kilometers (1,500 miles) and a payload capacity of 1,000 kilograms (2,200 pounds)—could carry both conventional and nuclear warheads.

**Prime Minister Bhutto Proposes Arms Control Talks With India**

*BK0707154889 Islamabad Domestic Service in Urdu  
1500 GMT 7 Jul 89*

[Text] Answering questions during a breakfast meeting with British newspaper editors and senior journalists in London this morning, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto put forward a proposal for arms control negotiations between India and Pakistan so that the two countries can reduce their defense expenditures. She emphasized that Pakistan does not want a nuclear or conventional arms race in South Asia. Benazir Bhutto asked: If the United States and the Soviet Union can hold a dialogue on arms control, then why can't India and Pakistan also do so? There must be a permanent solution to problems and India and Pakistan should take steps to create an atmosphere of mutual trust, she observed.

The prime minister said the Pakistani people feel concerned at the testing of weapons like the Agni [Indian surface-to-surface] missile and the massive buildup in the naval force in their neighboring country. Such a situation puts pressure on the government, she added.

Nonetheless, the prime minister said, Pakistan-India relations have improved. She and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi held talks in Islamabad on the occasion of the summit conference of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation [SAARC] in December last year and later signed agreements, including one on not attacking each other's nuclear installations.

The prime minister announced that Rajiv Gandhi will come to Islamabad on 16 July and she herself will visit India and other SAARC member-countries next month. Thus, contacts are being maintained at the highest level in order to further improve bilateral relations.

Answering another question, Benazir Bhutto said her government's policy is not to manufacture a nuclear

bomb or any nuclear weapon, as Pakistan is against nuclear proliferation.

Explaining the situation in Afghanistan, the prime minister said Pakistan wants a political solution of the Afghan problem.

Radio Pakistan's special correspondent, Safdar Ahad, says that the prime minister also referred to her government's policy of giving special attention to social sectors like education, health, and employment.

**Conversion of INF-Limited Equipment to Civilian Use**  
*52000059 Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE*  
*in English No 4, Apr 89 pp 27-29*

[Article by Oleg Mamalyga, USSR State Prizewinner, designer of military hardware]

[Text] More than a year has passed since the signing of the Treaty eliminating intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. Now they are being destroyed. For the economy this means the irreversible destruction of materialized billions spent on the development, manufacture and operation of missile systems plus new, quite substantial allocations for the implementation of the Treaty. Next on the list is sophisticated military hardware from the category of "conventional armaments". But is it impossible to do something to save at least some of the people's money and enormous labor efforts wasted on the production of lethal weapons? A rational proprietary approach, the expert believes, would make possible partial utilization of destroyed weapons and equipment for peaceful purposes—naturally, without going against fulfillment of international agreements.

The complexity of the task is obvious; it is inherent in the very purpose of each weapon, each detail of fulfilling a strictly specialized task. Its optimal fulfillment still lies ahead. But already today there are several ways of using obsolete missile systems in the national economy, without thoughtlessly handing them over to "peaceful explosions".

This is the simplest and most profitable way. Under the INF Treaty each side is allowed to put on public display 15 dummies of missiles. This will be regarded as their destruction. However, the current plans for putting eleven missiles in five of the country's museums, including Kapustin Yar, the cosmodrome township, and the settlement in Moscow Region won't yield appreciable results, since the last two are put on show in places which are practically inaccessible for visitors.

The number of such paid exhibitions or observation platforms could be sharply increased on agreement between the USSR the USA, by arranging them in major centers to be visited by tourists, including from abroad. This will help raise a lot of money, including foreign currency if Intourist and Sputnik include them in their itineraries.

The rational utilization of "missile waste" is not too far off on the horizon. The Soviet-West German joint venture "Kranlod" has already been established to re-equip tractors of RSD-10 [SS-20] launchers into heavy-duty self-propelled cranes. In the development of this idea it would be possible to establish a mixed company to re-equip tractors of launchers and means of transportation for RMD-23 [SS-23] missiles into self-propelled

collapsible platforms for the repair and service of various tall structures: radiorelay masts, power transmission lines, technological columns at chemical enterprises and so on.

In this case it will become possible to utilize properly and not as a scrap the most sophisticated instruments, hydraulic systems, autonomous electric and hydro-power sources and the tractors themselves, without turning it all into scrap. According to preliminary estimates, the national economy would recover technical facilities worth more than 40 million roubles.

Any machine-building industry which needs fast-operating power units would be glad to get steering gears from missile stages. They must be removed before the missiles are destroyed, that's all. This operation alone would save for peaceful production material values worth more than 15 million roubles, if we set to work immediately, because more than 500 missiles have already been destroyed.

Giving up the method accepted in our country for the destruction of RSD-10 [SS-20], RMD-22 [SS-12] and RMD-23 [SS-23] missiles by blasting and passing on to the burning of power units, as is done by Americans, it will be possible to recover for the national economy materials (extra-hard steel, titanium, tungsten, molybdenum, etc.) to the sum of 3 million or more roubles. In this case the containers of the RSD-10 [SS-20] missiles are cut approximately into two equal parts, as foreseen by the Treaty, thus making it possible to use in civil construction glass-reinforced plastic pipes about 2 m in diameter and 8 m long. And we are going to blast about 1,000 such pipes.

Technologies for the proposed method of destruction may be developed rather promptly, corresponding equipment and instruments too can be made quickly or matched from available ones. If there is a decision, there will be no lack of cooperation on the part of designers. So, it is up to competent bodies to decide.

It would be a good idea to ask organizations developing weapons to make technical prospectuses and catalogues of units, systems and other armaments for use in various branches of the civil economy or even at personal plots. With these prospectuses it is possible to arrange exhibition-sales where arms development experts would give consultations.

Worth special consideration is the question of whether to make better use of control systems removed from missiles before they are destroyed, and also the means of verifying the serviceability of missiles which are also not subject to elimination under the Treaty. They include computers, not to mention effective power supply sources, vans and so on.



The creative potential of as many people as possible must be drawn to the search for technical approaches to these and other problems of the disarmament economy. Cooperatives, foreign businessmen and companies should be encouraged to take part by a wide range of material incentives for work in this direction. In principle, all future disarmament treaties must meet the technical and economic interests of civil production.

What really suggests itself is the peaceful utilization of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles for geophysical investigations. The existing geophysical (meteorological) rockets, used in combination with artificial Earth satellites, leave a big space of elevation without regular scientific investigations, since the Soviet MR-12 meteorological rocket may lift loads of about 50 kg to an altitude of not more than 150 kilometers.

According to my estimates, the eliminated Soviet RMD-22 [SS-12] missile could lift loads of about 100 kg to an altitude of over 500 kilometers. The possibilities of the American Pershing-1A are similar. The RMD-23 [SS-23] missile can lift the same weight about 300 km high. This will make it possible to broaden the framework of geophysical research, which is important for understanding the processes taking place in the atmosphere and in near-Earth space, the influence of solar and geomagnetic activity on the climate and so on.

Let's calculate. The development cost of the geophysical rocket "from the zero stage" with necessary take-off equipment close to the specified could make 70-100 million roubles, while the cost of such a rocket in mass production would be 300,000-500,000 roubles (not considering the cost of the payload). If we accept that geophysicists need about 100 of these rockets for a major research programme, their total cost will amount to 100-150 million roubles, plus the cost of preparing and effecting launchings. This will be a saving if "written off" combat missiles are used in research.

The need for such rockets is rather limited. But scientists from other countries could mount their technical facilities on them and place an order with us for special-purpose launchings on a commercial basis. The staging of international experiments is worthwhile too.

This work must be done openly, with advance announcements of the permanent sites for launching such rockets on the USSR territory, indicating the research ships of the State Committee of the USSR for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control, from which ocean research will be conducted.

Naturally, using missiles this way would call for a correction of INF Treaty and would be carried out under strict international control. Today, when trust between the two great powers is increasing, such a solution seems quite logical.

Simultaneously, with the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles talks are continuing on a 50-per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons, and significant cut in conventional armaments lie ahead. Are we really unable to dispose cleverly of the diverse military hardware which will be removed from armaments—missiles, launchers, transportation means, tanks, infantry, combat machines, artillery, helicopters... I believe it is necessary to draw into negotiations skilled technical and economic experts for the texts of future agreements to envisage methods of eliminating arms and military equipment which are most profitable from the economic and ecological viewpoints.

To speed up development of corresponding technologies, it would be desirable to set up under UN aegis an international conference or symposium of experts in defence and civil industries. Such a forum would examine the whole range of practical problems of disarmament—from technological, economic, ecological to organization including the working out of special interstate perspective programmes.

One of such issues is transition to ecologically pure solid fuels for missiles and banning of existing fuels which contaminate the environment. (Ecologically pure fuels for the Soviet Energia space carrier-rocket). The importance of such understanding is hard to overestimate. Apart from military sphere, solid-fuel engines are also widely used in world industry, causing acid rains and other unpleasant phenomena.

Thus, the international conference on problems under review would have far-reaching favorable consequences, having outlined the range of problems calling for the conclusion of corresponding agreements, and having oriented the participating countries towards the elaboration of national programmes.

In the context of preparing the USSR for such international discussion, I think it would be necessary to hold an inter-sectoral conference on conversion, including rational utilization of weapons, with the participation of experts of the defence and civil industry, heads of corresponding ministries and departments. It would be possible to invite to this "brain attack" experts from the UN, the USA and other countries.

#### **Equipment Destruction Under INF Treaty Hit on Economic Grounds**

52000062x Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 13 Jul 89 p 2

["Excerpts" from readers' letters and commentary: "Today Begins Tomorrow": first paragraph is introduction—For the text of the interview with O. Mamalyga referred to, see the FBIS Daily Report: SOVIET UNION, FBIS-SOV-89-080, 27 April 1989, p 2]

[Text] Formally we workers of enterprises of the former Ministry of Light and the Food Industry, came under the aegis of the "defense industry" just a few days ago.

Actually, even before this a certain part of our output was oriented toward special (read: defense) products. So the discussion conducted by the newspaper on problems of conversion misplaces us twice over. The wall mentioned by O. Mamalyga ("Economics of Disarmament," SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, 13 April of this year) runs not by us but through us. This is probably why we are especially sensitive to cases of destruction of colossal material values in connection with the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty. These values were created through the incredible efforts of generations of Soviet people, their sweat and blood, prolonged self-discipline, and billions and billions taken from our pockets!

Of course to eliminate war and save civilization is a lofty and noble goal. But why destroy material values... No, we cannot reconcile ourselves to this approach. Because the great scientific-technical and material potential created in the defense branches can and should serve the national good not tomorrow but today.

Even yesterday one could not dream of using the technology of some secret shop or section for the manufacture of regular products. But now specialists from the defense complex have visited us. Proposals were generated and they have been realized. Here is just one example.

We have traditionally used thin-walled pipes for manufacturing the working parts of the carding machine for processing flax and wool. The turner was the main figure here. From these parts alone 210 tons of metal went to shavings. And there were not enough turners and the metal wrong and the quality was not quite good enough. Recently we have been using rotation drawing which previously was far beyond our reach. Productivity increased by a factor of 5-6. The coefficient of the utilization of metal increased to 0.85. What was previously unattainable quality of the component became a reality. Thirty highly skilled turners are being released.

Is that good? Yes. But still... I still will not say that we are experiencing deep satisfaction.

A couple of days ago the figures were made public: By the end of the year 40 percent of the military production should be changed over to civilian. Naturally, I cannot give the specific figure for our association. But the volume of defense industry products is decreasing, and significantly. And this means that the materials, components, and batching items that were ordered at one time will become so-called nonliquid assets. I repeat other SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA authors: Their value is very great.

Among the batching items, for example, that will become nonliquid assets, for example, are valves. Probably millions of these simple components are used in national economic output. But they are qualitatively different items. For example, the valves for agricultural irrigation equipment do not last very long since they are made of

far from the best grades of metal. But our valves, when they are used in frigates or other similar equipment, will last for years or perhaps decades. Do we have a right to expatiate on any real advantage of we do not use them for their intended purposes?

The list of our nonliquid assets includes both the latest items and those created years ago. But both are guarded by conditions of the strictest secrecy. It would seem that the first step in normalizing and streamlining the process of conversion should be a legislative act from the highest state organ of authority which would establish the specific period of a ban on the outflow of parts, components, materials, and technologies from the defense industry into the peacetime branches. I emphasize: We need a mandatory law which is the same for all ministries and departments, for all of today's "pyramid" of the defense industry.

When will such an act appear? Time will not stand still: The destruction of the resources is not far in the future. And we are certainly not speaking about Tekhmash alone: Our association is only a speck of dust in comparison to the giants of the defense complex. So we can only guess at the amounts of the forthcoming losses. So before adopting a law on the transfer, apparently, it is necessary to have some kind of decree or instructions from the USSR Council of Ministers concerning conducting in the branches competitions of proposals for the utilization of technologies, materials, and components. Discussions of problems of conversion must be put on a practical basis. And competitions will be a realistic mechanism for counteracting the destruction of property that has accumulated in the warehouses.

It is far from easy to break down what has been formed over decades by the administrative management system. And it must be broken down not by command methods (although it is impossible to do without regulating legal acts) but by economic ones. And the most important of them is placing the entire budget both of the army and of the industry that supports it under the public control of officials elected by the people. Let the military request funds based on the doctrine of adequate defense. And the people's deputies at the congresses, after careful and open analysis of the appetites of the military department, decide the quantity of funds to allot and for which items. Then we shall not have this senseless freezing of resources that could effectively serve for our well-being.

[signed] V. Zhestkov, general director of the Tekhmash PO [Production Association], Orel

#### Lines From Letters

In my opinion, the designer O. Mamalyga has changed the problem of conversion into an aspect of public opinion. With our generally recognized poverty and inefficiency we are still destroying the final results of production—the commodity! Indeed, what nonsense!

I completely and fully support the idea of "economical disarmament" for its practical significance and purposefulness.

[signed] V. Samodin, Moscow Oblast

Why not use the destroyed missiles for peaceful (world) purposes? Why not create a space station under the aegis of the United Nations? We could count how many launches could be made from one of our units and one American one and leave a corresponding number of missiles intact. And then at the request of any of the UN member nations we could launch them for peaceful purposes. Perhaps even free of charge. And we could organize a competition of scientific programs! In this case the missiles would still be destroyed but it would be for the good of mankind.

I fully support O. Mamalyga's proposals. I myself served in Kapustin Yar during the seventies. I know what missiles are. I think we must take an economical approach to writing off military equipment. Why not use the missiles for launching communications satellites? This would significantly expand and improve telephone communications in the country as well as the number of radio and television channels. For unlike European countries, which have satellite television throughout Europe, we have nothing of the kind.

[signed] V. Shcherbak, Krasnodar Kray

Like all Soviet people, I welcomed the INF Treaty. But when I saw on television how they are destroying the missiles with explosions I was so upset: Such a barbarian way of destroying public (albeit military) property! Do we really not have the intelligence to use the complete missile systems that are being eliminated for the needs of the national economy?

Esteemed editors, ask the responsible officials to respond on the pages of your newspaper (SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA is also my newspaper; I have subscribed to it since the first issue) to the questions raised by O. Mamalyga.

[signed] G. Makarin, Belgorod

#### Our Commentary

As the mail shows, the conversation with the military equipment designer Oleg Ivanovich Mamalyga interested the readers a great deal. Alas, among the responses there were no answers from ministries and departments involved in the problem. Neither from defense nor civilian departments. We asked USSR Minister of Defense D. Yazov personally to grant the newspaper an interview concerning problems of conversion and disarmament. For you cannot get away from problems in this way which is not very popular in a time of glasnost. And,

judging from the forthcoming disarmament, the army has many problems. And the army can hardly conquer them by itself. Or does the comrade minister think differently?

[signed] I. Klimenko, newspaper's editor for the department of machine building and new technology.

#### Chief of Staff Moiseyev Interviewed on Troop Reduction

18010814z Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 9, May 89 p 5

[Interview with Army General M. A. Moiseyev, chief of USSR Armed Forces General Staff, first deputy minister of defense of the USSR, on the upcoming reduction of forces and armament, by V. Belyayev; date and place not given: "Soldiers Take Off Their Overcoats"]

[Text] [Belyayev] The upcoming reduction of the USSR Armed Forces by 500,000 persons unquestionably is a very responsible step which proves that our state adheres unwaveringly in practice to the new political thinking and new military doctrine. The significance of the unilateral reduction in USSR forces and armaments is quite understandable on a general, humanistic, moral plane, but here is the question that arises. We know that the Warsaw Pact Organization today has 1,223,000 persons fewer than NATO. And many are concerned: Will the reduction weaken the country's defensive capability? What is the basis for the boldness of the step that has been taken?

[Moiseyev] We too asked ourselves this question. Everything was carefully thought out. It was taken into account that major positive changes had occurred in the world in recent years thanks above all to CPSU activity: the threat of war was reduced and tension in the international situation abated. On the whole the military-political factors affecting our Motherland's security became more favorable. All this then allowed us to realize in fact the main principle of Soviet Armed Forces organizational development, which is defense sufficiency. This consists of the following: to have an Army and Navy in the minimum makeup necessary for reliable repulse of aggression. It stands to reason that in this case it is a question of a qualitatively different structure of large and small units.

[Belyayev] But obviously it also must be a question of qualitatively different and more advanced armament and a qualitatively different, better trained and more qualified serviceman—soldier and officer. Is that not so?

[Moiseyev] Of course. I will not be revealing a secret when I say that the most modern equipment (by world standards) now is becoming operational. Some kinds were demonstrated by our specialists both to military officials of western states coming to the USSR as well as abroad. Suffice it to recall the interest generated by demonstrating the MIG-29 at the air show in England.



This equipment of course demands that servicemen have a higher level of knowledge. Here one could recall the 1960's, when there was a significant reduction of Armed Forces in the USSR. Well, at that time military schools as a rule were secondary schools with a 2-year or 3-year training period and they prepared officers with a secondary military education. Almost all military schools now function under programs of higher educational institutions with a 4-year or 5-year period of training. The cadets' theoretical and practical training has increased and their general technical and special horizons have expanded. Today the Armed Forces officer corps consists almost entirely of specialists with a higher or higher specialized education.

The physical training facility of higher educational institutions has increased in scope and has been upgraded qualitatively. Here is an indicator: cadet training expenses now are 1.5-2 times higher than in the 1960's.

The personnel's moral and volitional training also plays an important role in military affairs. We can rely on our enlisted men, officers and generals here.

Based on all this I can say with all responsibility that the upcoming reduction will not damage the country's defensive capability. The Soviet Union's Armed Forces are constantly in readiness to reliably defend their Motherland and our allies and to repel any aggression.

[Belyayev] You said that today's officers receive a higher education under the programs of ordinary civilian universities. Does this mean that those who will be discharged from the Armed Forces will be able to work in the national economy?

[Moiseyev] Unquestionably, and the national economy will receive replacements of highly skilled specialists in electronics, nuclear power engineering, electrical engineering, and applied mathematics, i.e., in science-intensive sectors, as they say. Nevertheless, despite good professional training, special education, and the presence of diplomas of a unionwide model, a certain portion of servicemen being discharged will have to undergo retraining or will have to raise qualifications in specific specialties. What is being done in this regard?

The USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems drew up a comprehensive plan of measures for job placement and for solving other problems of social security of servicemen being discharged from the USSR Armed Forces during 1989-1990. This plan in particular provides for retraining servicemen and members of their families in a training-course network of enterprises and organizations, in vocational-technical schools, and in educational institutions.

[Belyayev] And so the principle of social justice will be observed more strictly during the upcoming reduction in the Armed Forces than during the reduction in the 1960's?

[Moiseyev] The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree "On a Reduction in the USSR Armed Forces and in Defense Expenditures During 1989-1990" dated 21 March of this year obligated local soviets of people's deputies to take necessary steps for job placement and to provide living space for officers, warrant officers, and extended-term servicemen being discharged to the reserve or who are retiring. For its part the Ministry of Defense will build more than 100 60-apartment to 80-apartment houses over a 2-year period in various regions of the country for the servicemen being discharged.

[Belyayev] And will an officer discharged from the Armed Forces with consideration of his wishes, as noted in the press, fully receive a pension together with earnings while working in the national economy?

[Moiseyev] In accordance with USSR Council of Ministers Decree No 986 dated 10 November 1982, which is in force, working officer retirees are paid a pension for years served with consideration of earnings in an amount such that the pension together with earnings does not exceed the base pay and allowances for position and military rank received by the serviceman before discharge from active military duty and the percentage increment for years served in officer positions. In all cases, however, the retiree keeps at least half of the designated pension with any amount of earnings.

That procedure for pension payment realistically ensures an opportunity not only for maintaining the discharged officer's level of financial support which existed in the period of his Army service, but also for exceeding this level.

[Belyayev] I would like to return to the basic subject of our conversation. How can a reduction in force be compensated? By improving the quality of personnel training? If the answer is "yes," then will changes in the USSR Law "On Universal Military Obligation" introduced by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase dated 10 April of this year help solve that problem?

[Moiseyev] I think that to pose the question of compensating for a reduction in force would be incorrect. This would signify following the path of NATO countries, which favor compensating for the intermediate and lesser range missiles being eliminated in Europe. We have no plans to compensate for the reduction in force.

With respect to the second part of the question, the decision to call up graduates of higher educational institutions which have no military chairs for one year of military service, as provided for by this Ukase, stems from a need for them to fulfill their constitutional obligation of defending the socialist homeland in one



form or another. In this case military training is provided in the form of active military service, but with its duration shortened to one year.

[Belyayev] But will this not lead to certain intellectual losses for society? Let us assume that a student has studied excellently in an institute for all five years and he already has laid certain scientific groundwork; it can be said that he is a ready-made post-graduate student, but he is called up. On returning from the Army the young man will have to restore what he has lost. It seems there is the alternative of restoring military chairs in all higher educational institutions. Or will military training at civilian higher educational institutions still be contrary to interests of the Armed Forces?

[Moiseyev] The presence of military chairs in a number of higher educational institutions is determined by a real need for peacetime training of the necessary number of reserve officers on a certain list of specific military specialties. There is presently no need to increase the number of higher educational institutions with military chairs, since they essentially will "work" only to free the graduates of these higher educational institutions from active military service.

[Belyayev] Students of higher educational institutions have a deferment from call-up until the completion of training. How about pupils of secondary specialized educational institutions?

[Moiseyev] A deferment for obtaining a secondary education is granted to pupils of secondary schools of general education and secondary specialized educational institutions if they had no secondary education before entering. All youths studying in secondary schools, rural vocational-technical schools and tekhnikums based on eight grades comfortably receive a secondary or secondary specialized education up to age 20.

But it is illegal to grant youths a deferment to obtain a secondary education twice (the first time for completing tenth grade and the second time for attaining a specialty in a tekhnikum).

[Belyayev] The mass media sometimes express the opinion that it would be more advantageous to have a professional Army where people sign up voluntarily. What thoughts does the military high command have on this score?

[Moiseyev] The Ministry of Defense thoroughly studied and researched this question from all aspects—economic, military, sociopolitical.

I will note first that the volunteer nucleus (officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, and service-women) now makes up approximately 35 percent of the overall strength of the Soviet Army and Navy.

From a military standpoint, of course, the level of professional training and education of Armed Forces personnel with manpower acquisition based on long-term (up to 20-25 years) and short-term (3-6 years) contracts is considerably higher than with manpower acquisition based on universal military obligation with enormously lesser periods of service (up to two years). But the serious flaw of voluntary service is that there is a significant reduction in the possibility of building up militarily trained reserves needed for Armed Forces deployment under the mobilization plan.

With this in mind, the most suitable is the mixed system of manpower acquisition for the Armed Forces that is in force in the FRG and French armies as well as essentially in the USSR.

From a sociopolitical aspect a professional volunteer army contradicts the fundamental principles of military organizational development of the socialist state that proclaims defense of the homeland to be the duty of every USSR citizen. If we speak of a law-and-order state with principles of social justice, all USSR male citizens must be under equal conditions in performing this constitutional duty.

From an economic standpoint, costs for current upkeep of the Armed Forces will sharply increase (according to our estimates, by three or four times) if they are manned by personnel according to a voluntary principle. Also additional one-time expenses of up to five billion rubles will be required for building and renovating everyday social and cultural facilities. Judge for yourself whether or not this is acceptable now under conditions of financial difficulties.

In this connection I would like to mention what the contribution of the USSR Ministry of Defense can be to the country's economy. USSR Ministry of Defense industrial enterprises are quickly stepping up the production of consumer goods. Their output volume in 1989 will more than double in comparison with 1988 and will quadruple in 1990 in comparison with this same period. The volume of paid services to the population provided by military units, establishments, enterprises and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense will increase and will be around a half-billion rubles in 1990.

**Assessment of French Nuclear Submarine Force**  
*18010819x Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
24 Jun 89 First Edition p 5

[Article by Captain Third Rank A. Gladkov under the rubric "In Foreign Armies and Navies": "Cornerstone of French Strategy"]

[Text] Increasing its military expenditures each year, the government of France allots a significant portion of the funds to the development of its strategic nuclear forces. Thus, their share will total 40.7 billion francs or 22.3 percent of the entire military budget this year. The

strategic nuclear forces, which constitute the foundation of France's military might, consist of three components: land-based ballistic missiles, medium-range strategic bombers, and fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). Up to 80 percent of the striking power of the strategic nuclear forces is concentrated aboard nuclear submarines, which are continually being improved.

Fleet ballistic missile submarines and technical support resources are brought together in a special strategic naval command, which is organizationally an element of the Navy. It includes an SSBN squadron (activated in 1971), a naval strategic forces base located in the region of Brest (a basing point at Ile-Longue, a training center at Roche-Douvre, and an arsenal of ballistic missiles at Gennevre), and a communications center at Rosne. There are about 3,200 people in the strategic naval command. All the servicemen are volunteers, and the majority of them serve under long-term contracts. To be assigned to an SSBN crew, the officers and sailors undergo special tests.

Presently there are six SSBN's in the force composition: Five are of the "Redoutable" class (the "Redoutable," the "Terrible," the "Foudroyant," the "Indomitable," and the "Tonnant"), and one is of the "Inflexible" class. Originally, the first two submarines were armed with M1 ballistic missiles with a range of 2,500 kilometers. The SSBN "Foudroyant," introduced into the force composition of the Navy in 1974, was already armed with M2 missiles (range of 3,000 kilometers). Then, beginning with the "Indomitable," M20 missiles with a range exceeding 3,000 kilometers were installed on the submarines. By the beginning of the eighties all the SSBN "Redoutable" class submarines were armed with M20 missiles as the result of a refitting.

The SSBN "Inflexible," delivered to the Navy in 1985, is armed principally with a new M4 3-stage ballistic missile with a range of 5,300 kilometers and carrying in its front section six thermonuclear devices with a yield of 150 kilotons each. Each device can be delivered on a single target, or all six warheads can be dispersed over an area of about 20,000 square kilometers. The rearming of four SSBN's with these missiles was begun in 1987. The modernization of the "Tonnant" is complete, and performance tests on the "Indomitable" are being concluded. The "Terrible" and the "Foudroyant" are next. According to a statement by France's Minister of Defense J.-P. Chevenement, by 1992, after conversion to the M4 ballistic missiles, the country's naval strategic forces will have at its disposal 500 warheads, which can be launched from the missile-armed submarines in a single salvo.

To replace its existing submarines, France has undertaken the construction of a new generation of SSBN's, which will incorporate all the achievements of nuclear submarine construction. They will have a significantly larger displacement (approximately 14,200 tons) and modern hydroacoustic and electronics intelligence equipment. A significant decrease in the level of noise is

anticipated, which will complicate an enemy's task of searching for the submarines. Construction of the leading SSBN of the new series, the "Triomphant," was begun in 1988 at the shipyard in Cherbourg. According to information from Admiral B. Luzot, France's Navy Chief of Staff, it should be introduced into the force composition of the Navy in 1994. Subsequent submarines will be delivered to the Navy at intervals of 2 and ½ years. In this manner, France's missile-armed submarine fleet will be completely renovated by the year 2008, when the program will be completed.

The M5 ballistic missile is being developed specially for the new generation of missile-armed submarines. Its front section, according to the French press, will have as many as 12 nuclear warheads. However the missile is expected to come into service only in the year 2000, and plans have been made to equip the first two "Triomphant" class submarines with the M45 missile, with a range exceeding 5,000 kilometers and carrying nuclear warheads. The third and subsequent SSBN's will be armed with M5 missiles.

Since 1985, three missile-armed submarines are continually on combat patrol. This figure, according to Admiral Luzot, is determined by operational needs and conditions for the servicing of arms and equipment. To maintain such a volume of combat utilization of the SSBN's, the following cycle of activity has been established: For two weeks the submarines are prepared for departure to sea; combat patrol lasts 8-10 weeks; and for 4-5 weeks repairs and routine checks are performed at the point of basing after the submarine returns from patrol.

For each SSBN there are 2 interchangeable crews, a "blue" and a "red," each with 135 people, 15 of whom are officers. In addition to the 12 combat crews, a thirteenth has been created, a "green." Its personnel are used to bring the regular crews going to sea up to prescribed strength levels. After a return from patrol, the personnel hand the submarine over to their reliefs over a period of several days and then leave for a vacation. After their vacation, the crew spends six weeks in a training center undergoing a course of practice drills on simulators to maintain professional qualifications.

Before each combat patrol the general officer in command of the strategic naval command personally inspects the submarine over a period of two days, after which he gives the order for the departure.

On combat patrol, only the commander knows the location of the SSBN; the crew do not know. Upon receiving a signal to launch the missiles, a coded signal is entered into a computer, which issues control data for the missiles. The commander and his second-in-command simultaneously enter a code, and only in this event is the firing chain initiated.

Taking into account the great psychological and physical strain experienced by the crew on combat patrol, the command element of the Navy has paid great attention to improving living conditions on the submarine and has granted the personnel substantial additional privileges. Aboard the SSBN there are a library, a videotape recorder, and a film projector. According to the French press, each member of the crew has the right to receive a radio-telegram of up to 30 words once a week from his family. The commander examines these radio-telegrams beforehand, and if in his opinion some piece of news will be distressing to the addressee, the commander has the right to withhold the telegram.

The radio transmitting center in Rosne is intended for the transmission of signals to the SSBN at sea. According to the press, the transmission is sent using very low

frequencies, which permit reception of the signal while the submarine is submerged to a depth of up to 15 meters. If the SSBN is at a very great depth, an antenna may be used which ascends to a depth where reception is dependable.

The constant attention which the military and political leadership of France gives to the development of sea-based strategic nuclear forces indicates that it attaches great importance to the role which they are called upon to play in a modern war. The naval strategic forces are used as the cornerstone of the French strategy of "nuclear deterrence." The French ruling circles base the development and perfection of these forces on the desire to keep France firmly at the level of the world's third nuclear power.

## AUSTRIA

### Austria Joins Anti-Chemical Weapons Organization

AU1007095089 Vienna DER STANDARD in German  
10 Jul 89 p 3

[Lydia Ninz report: "Chemical Weapons Control: Austria Has Become a Member of the Australian Club"]

[Excerpt] Vienna—Austria joined the "Australian Club" at the end of last week. The Australian Club is an informal association of about 20 Western industrial nations that was established to control particularly dangerous chemicals that can be used for the production of chemical weapons.

The association, which includes large industrial nations such as EC members, the United States, Japan, Canada, and Switzerland, plays a pioneering role in the Geneva talks on a worldwide chemical weapons convention. [passage omitted]

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

### Reaction to Gorbachev Council of Europe Speech

#### Genscher Says SNF Views Converging

AU0707122089 Hamburg DPA in German  
1051 GMT 7 Jul 89

[Text] Bonn—According to FRG Foreign Minister Genscher, the ideas that the East and West have about the issue of short-range missiles "do not differ so widely." He said in a Saarländischer Rundfunk interview that this had become clear with Gorbachev's speech in Strasbourg. The foreign minister said that U.S. President George Bush rightly assumed that initial results on conventional stability could be achieved within 6 or 12 months. Genscher added that Gorbachev shares the view that it is possible to achieve results soon. He said the time span not only shows that both sides are in favor of negotiations on short-range weapons; it also shows that following the NATO summit a certain agreement has developed regarding the time factor.

Michaela Geiger, foreign policy spokeswoman of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union Bundestag group, welcomed the readiness signaled by Gorbachev to unilaterally reduce Soviet short-range weapons. In a Deutschlandfunk interview, she criticized the fact that the Soviet Union does not intend to start reducing these weapons before the negotiations begin.

### Speech Not Seen as Disappointing

AU0707111489 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 7 Jul 89 p 1

["N.M." commentary: "A Different Gorbachev"]

[Text] In France a Gorbachev different from the one the Western public knows presented himself: He made no new proposals, and during the speech to the Council of Europe, which was greatly publicized, he announced largely well-known things. This is no reason to be disappointed; it rather strengthens hope that the Kremlin leader has realized that what is important now is to work out details and make progress at the disarmament talks, primarily at the Vienna talks on conventional stability, and in narrowing differences between East and West. Offers have been submitted on nearly all kinds of weapons. To introduce further topics, on which the political leaderships would have to reach agreement, would not be conducive to progress but would cause delay. This also applies to short-range nuclear weapons, which Gorbachev mentioned again in Strasbourg. NATO has spoken its mind on this issue in Brussels: Talks on this category can be opened, but only on the condition that agreement is reached on conventional disarmament.

Gorbachev repeated his vision of the "common European home" before the Council of Europe. However, it will remain unreal as long as Moscow is not ready to admit that the Wall and the barbed wire that divide this home are due for demolition. An answer to the German question must be found if the postwar situation is to be replaced by a new order. President Mitterrand was cautious when he spoke of the "choice of the Germans," referring to self-determination, and about changes in peace, which should not become "a cause of new tensions." When Mitterrand accorded weight to what the Four Powers have to say, in accordance with their responsibility for the whole of Germany, he was certainly also addressing Bonn politicians who think they can do without the consent of those European neighbors.

On the eve of his visit to France, Gorbachev, in a dramatic appeal, called on his compatriots to exercise restraint in the nationality issue. In Paris he also mentioned numerous difficulties that restructuring is encountering. There is no doubt that the Kremlin leader is facing considerable problems at home. Gorbachev has succeeded in strengthening his power, but there is the danger that his political vigor may slacken under the gigantic mass of the complex that he wants to move.

### Foreign Minister Genscher Applauds Warsaw Pact Meeting

LD0907115589 Hamburg DPA in German  
1040 GMT 9 Jul 89

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher positively assessed on Sunday the results of the Warsaw Pact summit meeting which ended



the day before. According to a press release from the Foreign Ministry, he sees in the results a "further conceptual rapprochement between East and West."

Genscher stressed that the seven states of the Eastern military alliance "are declaring their belief in an indivisible Europe of lasting peace and cooperation." They also share the Western view "that peace is not really guaranteed without the realization of human rights."

Genscher also pointed out that the Warsaw Pact now also sees the possibility of achieving the first agreements in the negotiations on conventional armed forces as early as 1990. The timetable for negotiations on nuclear short-range missiles became more concrete because of this, because the earlier an agreement on conventional arms can be put into practice, the earlier negotiations can be commenced on nuclear short-range weapons.

#### **Defense Minister Discusses Disarmament, Detente**

AU1107104889 Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 8-9 Jul 89 p 12

[Interview with FRG Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg by Stephan-Andreas Casdorff and Josef Joffe: "We Want to Clearly Reduce the Excessive Number of Nuclear Weapons in Europe"; date and place not given]

[Text] SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG [SZ]: In your article in SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG you pointed out that the Bundeswehr has suffered once already from an "acceptance crisis"—referring to rearmament—but that this was settled by the consensus of the big parties in the 1960's. How do you want to reestablish this consensus today?

Gerhard Stoltenberg: Of course, today's situation is different from that in the 1950's. But certain basic questions emerge again and again. The ethical justification of the defense policy, of military service, and of the soldier's profession is one, the second basic question is the assessment of nuclear weapons. But, looking back to the dramatic conflicts in the 1950's shows that the Bundeswehr, the Atlantic Alliance, and nuclear weapons have had a peace-promoting, stabilizing effect for decades. This is not to be used to ignore new questions, but one must not ignore this fact either.

SZ: Between 60 and 80 percent of the population want denuclearization. However, you say that nuclear weapons have preserved peace for 40 years. How can one pursue politics between these two standpoints.

Stoltenberg: According to the polls in the years 1951-55, the FRG Government should never have called for rearmament and pushed this through in the Bundestag. In the same way, more than 90 percent of the Bundestag

deputies should not have passed the defense constitution. Then there would never have been an FRG contribution to NATO's nuclear defense—even though we never had the power of disposition and will never strive for it....

SZ: ...that was in the past.

Stoltenberg: Right, historical reminiscences are not enough. In our time, a more far-reaching, more profound justification is necessary, which also takes new questions and fears seriously.

SZ: What justification?

Stoltenberg: In April, in the coalition and together with the allies at the NATO summit we came out in favor of several principles. Arms control and disarmament have become an even higher priority goal. This also includes the will to further reduce the nuclear systems. In an equally clear way we said that for the foreseeable future an appropriate connection between conventional and nuclear systems is necessary to safeguard peace, if possible at a lower level. It is our goal to further clearly reduce the excessive number of nuclear weapons in Europe. However, this is only possible by means of binding, verifiable agreements with the Warsaw Pact, which cannot be achieved quite as easily as some people seem to think.

SZ: Do you want to go down in history as a minister of disarmament?

Stoltenberg: What is necessary is the correct combination of defense capability, which remains indispensable, and disarmament. I see a great challenge of our time in this combination.

SZ: The acceptance problem has a deeper origin. It reaches from nuclear weapons, which apparently nobody wants any more, to increasing conscientious objection, to the question: Why do we actually need this Bundeswehr? One cannot wage a war with it anyway, and we are not sovereign, either....

Stoltenberg: ...Yes, we also have to ask ourselves why these trends in the FRG are so different from the situation in France, for instance. There, there is still a national consensus from right to left, that the force de dissuasion, [french term used] the national nuclear armed forces, are indispensable. This is not just behavior determined by tradition, but also a position that is very clever and has an ethical basis. We must see that in our country some developments are different from those in the nation states of the Alliance which are determined by tradition. Of course, we have the special situation of a divided country. However, it would be very dangerous if we were to practically decouple ourselves. Furthermore: If we thoroughly examine the opinion polls, there is still very high approval of the Bundeswehr and of the Atlantic Alliance—80 to 90 percent.

SZ: Does the problem not lie somewhere else?

Stoltenberg: Yes, concerning the consequences of this approval, the situation has deteriorated. The readiness to accept burdens caused by the Armed Forces, also by the allied forces in our country, has clearly declined. This is where we must start. The politicians must make more serious efforts to lead opinion, not only to gain majorities in parliament, but also to have a stronger influence on public opinion. First of all, by clear language on the basic issues, then in the debate about the defense budget, about the soldiers' call for more attractive conditions, and about the necessary modern weapons systems. Willi Wieskirch, the Bundestag defense expert, noted that many politicians are lacking in this respect. The readiness to advocate indisputable requirements of the Bundeswehr—no matter whether this refers to the expansion of an arms depot or to a training facility—has declined even among the ranks of the government parties.

SZ: How can leadership with regard to opinion be regained?

Stoltenberg: First and foremost, by making those who bear responsibility in our state publicly advocate the concerns of the Bundeswehr. FRG President Von Weizsäcker recently did this in an impressive way by pointing out the very special ethical legitimization of military service. Of course, we respect the decision of conscience of those who do civilian, alternative service. But the president was also against deciding for alternative service just on the spur of the moment [beliebigkeit].

SZ: All other nations say that they need armies to protect their sovereignty. Can we also say this, or are we not quite so sovereign?

Stoltenberg: The FRG is a sovereign state with very few, clearly defined restrictions resulting from the special responsibility of the Western powers for all of Germany. The attempt of the Social Democratic Party of Germany to doubt this is misleading. In reality, the foreign policy weight of the FRG has visibly increased over the past years. This became clear at the NATO summit and during the visits by George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. Thus, we need have no complexes in this respect.

SZ: But the more disarmament we have, the less the citizens accept the burdens of national defense.

Stoltenberg: We welcome the great progress achieved in East-West relations, the initiated reduction of the excessive armament in the East Bloc. But the past few weeks in particular have shown that this is not a simple and comfortable path. We cannot rule out dramatic crises in Eastern Europe. Therefore, the fact that we continue to have armed forces in order to be able to tackle any critical situation is part of our foreign policy that safeguards peace. This also belongs to sovereignty.

SZ: However, our Armed Forces are not sovereign; they are totally integrated into NATO.

Stoltenberg: This is a decision of the FRG's sovereign constitutional organs and of almost all our partners; this is based on reciprocity.

SZ: Dramatic crises in Warsaw Pact countries: Do you include the Soviet Union here?

Stoltenberg: The internal tensions in the Soviet Union are increasing considerably. Gorbachev's unexpected television speech last week was characterized by urgent worry about the escalating nationality conflicts and the serious dangers for the unity of the Soviet Union. If we work with all our strength for the success of reforms and disarmament, we must also be aware of the risks. Otherwise, one would act in an illusory and irresponsible way.

SZ: Against this background, would it be a disaster if the Americans were to withdraw their troops from Europe?

Stoltenberg: In the future, too, we need the considerable presence of the United States. I want to say this very simply: As long as U.S. soldiers are stationed near the intra-German border, even in the event of a surprisingly negative development in the East Bloc, hardly anyone would get the idea of using military supremacy to achieve political goals, or even just threats and blackmail.

SZ: But in America some people say: "No nukes, no troops." In our country, however, the citizens only seem to want the "troops," but not the "nukes."

Stoltenberg: The question refers to short-range missiles. In the Alliance we have come to an understanding, after a difficult phase. At the NATO summit it was decisive that the denuclearization of Western Europe was rejected with desirable clarity—regardless of the decision about a follow-up system for Lance that must be made in 1992. The question about the individual elements for the necessary nuclear safeguarding of Western Europe is to be decided later. The policy of the Alliance continues to be that for the foreseeable future we need a combination of conventional and nuclear armed forces, if possible at a low level.

SZ: But on 27 April at the Bundestag session I heard that Mr Genscher said the possible new short-range systems are aimed at the GDR, the CSSR, and Poland, which—this is the implication—is not acceptable. Does this not lead to denuclearization? Or, What kind of nuclear weapons would then be acceptable?

Stoltenberg: I see the foreign minister's statement as an urgent admonition that we must be aware of the nuclear weapons' function to secure peace and that, of course, we want to do everything to prevent their use in the future. During the discussion in the Alliance there were some

very justified German concerns. But we must not forget that there are also intercontinental weapons, that can destroy America and the Soviet Union. In this respect, we must always see our special legitimate points of view in connection with the risks incurred by our allies, including the United States. I am pleased that, in the end, this was recognized by everyone and was also clearly stated.

SZ: Can you explain this a bit more in detail, this interlacing of risks...?

Stoltenberg: ...An overly massive concentration of nuclear artillery or short-range missiles exclusively in central Europe has given rise to some people's fear of being "singled out" [singularisierung] or "decoupling." But the result of the discussion in the coalition and with the allies is an increased awareness of the fact that all countries of the Alliance, including the United States, live with the threat of nuclear weapons.

SZ: Are we singled out?

Stoltenberg: No.

SZ: Why not?

Stoltenberg: The fact remains that in Western Europe we have long-range, air-based nuclear weapons. The fact remains that the sea-based, long-range weapons will be important in the future, and even if the number of intercontinental weapons is halved at the START negotiations, a large potential remains that directly affects the United States and the Soviet Union. A clear reduction is the goal of the various negotiations, but not the elimination of these weapons.

SZ: However, how do we stand on the modernization of land-based short-range missiles, especially since the Alliance supports Washington's decision to apply to Congress for money for research on and development of a Lance follow-up system?

Stoltenberg: This precautionary national decision has been expressly recognized by the Alliance. This is not connected with any preliminary decision about production and deployment. This decision is really to be made in 1992, on the basis of the security policy situation. In this connection, it will be of decisive importance whether the Soviet Union has reduced its conventional superiority in such a drastic way that the ability to attack or to carry out large-scale operations no longer exists. These are the criteria of the stocktaking that will take place in 1992. We would be ill-advised to try to anticipate this discussion after the difficult pre-summit period. We should strictly adhere to what has been achieved in the Alliance with the considerable participation of the FRG.

SZ: What have we really achieved? Negotiations on nuclear weapons after a drastic conventional reduction were more or less the U.S. line as early as January....

Stoltenberg: ...There was a stage in which important allies called for an immediate decision on follow-up systems for the Lance missiles. Our agreement is far more than a tactical delay. New elements of evaluation were introduced.

SZ: Which ones?

Stoltenberg: Those I have just mentioned. I deem it completely right to concentrate our efforts above all on the Vienna negotiations in the next few years. And if they produce results after a relatively short time, this will be a very great success. In addition, there are the negotiations on the elimination of chemical weapons, the START talks. This is a very ambitious program for the next 2 years, so there are good reasons why we are waiting for the results before taking a decision on Lance.

SZ: And if the negotiations do not proceed according to our wishes?

Stoltenberg: This will be an important yardstick for the decisions to be taken in 1992. But I do not think much of hypothetical questions. We have come together in a very laborious process, and therefore the dictates of reason and responsibility are doing the most necessary things now: to achieve the acceleration and favorable conclusion of the Vienna negotiations.

SZ: Back to a possible deterioration of the climate: Will we get another "hostile image"? You have always said that our Army does not need one.

Stoltenberg: We do not need and do not have any hostile images. We have already talked about analyses of threats before Gorbachev. Hostile images include what the GDR People's Army practised until recently: drawing an abominable image of one's political and ideological opponent.

SZ: Is this still so?

Stoltenberg: Yes, and this is not our concept, but there are still reasons to discuss analyses of threats—even if the trend has changed. In fact, Gorbachev's declarations of intent should be taken seriously. It is in his well-understood interest to pursue such a policy: The most important reason is the dramatic deterioration in the Soviet economic situation. However, we must be able to start from facts, not from declarations of intent, in the vital questions concerning our people. Despite reports on individual unilateral disarmament steps which have an effect in the media, the Soviet Union's military potential has not been significantly reduced so far. This must be laid down in the first place by binding agreements in Vienna, because unilateral measures can also be corrected unilaterally.

SZ: Imagine that everything works out well. What will we do with the Bundeswehr in this case?

Stoltenberg: The main point in Vienna is the reduction of the Eastern invasion capability, that is, reducing existing Soviet troops and their weapons systems. Concrete results in Vienna would create new conditions for the Bundeswehr that would affect defense planning.

SZ: What minimum strength must the Bundeswehr have in your opinion?

Stoltenberg: It is too early to say. By the end of this year the results of the present discussion on planning will be submitted.

SZ: You already have the basis. Could we reduce the Bundeswehr to 420,000 or to 400,000 men?

Stoltenberg: These are still speculative assumptions.

SZ: Independent of the forces of the other side, is a minimum number not still needed to maintain a long border and forward defense?

Stoltenberg: Forward defense also remains a cornerstone in future NATO planning. The need for troops and weapons systems in the nineties or after the year 2000 will be determined according to the Warsaw Pact's reductions.

SZ: Yet our geography does not change by virtue of disarmament.

Stoltenberg: No. Therefore we must stick to forward defense. We also need modern armed forces in the Alliance in the future, probably on a lower level of forces.

SZ: Is forward defense the eternal truth of German defense policy?

Stoltenberg: Whether there are opportunities for changes in NATO's detailed planning for armed forces and operative concepts cannot be answered separately today. I know from the governments of other allies that forward defense remains a cornerstone for them—for them and for us.

SZ: Weapons systems also play an important role. They are becoming increasingly expensive. I am thinking of the Jaeger 90. Will it be the last manned aircraft?

Stoltenberg: The military leadership of the Bundeswehr and the other responsible people say that flying units cannot be replaced in the foreseeable future. Whether another combination with other modern systems will become possible by long-term planning must be examined.

SZ: This leads us to low-altitude flights. You are discussing with the allies whether there are opportunities to reduce their low-altitude flights over German territory. Have all opportunities within the Federal Air Force already been exhausted?

Stoltenberg: The Air Force has transferred almost 50 percent of its training to foreign countries, and my predecessor already considerably reduced the volume of low-altitude flights. We are still examining changes. However, the scope is limited. We are considering the integration of bases abroad. This requires a cost-benefit analysis. We must consider the problems for the soldiers and civilian experts in distant places, for example, Canada. However, talks with the allies are especially important. I am continuing them.

SZ: There are flying systems that do not need exercises, that is, missiles. However, your predecessor discontinued a project—Technex-Kolas—that was apparently developed in this house. What do you think of unmanned flying equipment?

Stoltenberg: Experts tell me that in this sector—I will mention the catchword drone—there are definitely opportunities for development. I cannot yet comment on the other question in connection with the Technex development. I want to examine the topic in the second half of the year very carefully and then reach conclusions.

SZ: When will you travel to the GDR? Are you interested in meeting your GDR counterpart?

Stoltenberg: I do not rule out our meeting at a later date. I am saying this in connection with the Vienna negotiations. It is conceivable that I will also meet other Warsaw Pact defense ministers in Vienna, if the talks make good progress. In this context, a situation might arise in which a talk with the GDR defense minister will also be useful.

SZ: We are celebrating the 40th anniversary of the founding of the FRG and are talking about the cultivation of traditions. Does the Bundeswehr have any traditions at all?

Stoltenberg: The Bundeswehr can now look back on 35 years of independent, very positive development. Of course, the recollection of important former traditions of military reforms and of the Army is justified. I want to recall that the concept of internal leadership that I have persistently affirmed referred to Prussian-German history after 1806. What personalities like Scharnhorst and Gneisenau thought with a view to the future remains important today, despite changing times. Interpreted in this way, the cultivation of traditions is also important for the Bundeswehr. However, it has acquired a completely independent conception of itself as an army in a democratic state. And, compared to all former epochs of German history, this is an unmistakable feature.



SZ: And what about the special status within the state which the Army had in Prussia, in the era of national socialism?

Stoltenberg: A special status such as in the 12 dark years and, in a different form, in the empire, is impossible in our democratic order.

SZ: If the Bundeswehr is the true reflection of our society, no glorious future will lie ahead of it, for this society likes NATO and the Bundeswehr, but not the costs that are entailed. Then a democratic Bundeswehr will mean a very small Bundeswehr.

Stoltenberg: This coalition continues to stress its readiness—even though in accordance with strict standards—to provide the necessary means for the Bundeswehr. Majorities will also decide on defense and the Bundeswehr in the nineties. However, other majorities are conceivable that could result in a development that does not meet the minimum requirements any longer.

SZ: From Anglo-Saxon countries we know a democratic solution to the general unwillingness to do one's military service: In times of peace there are only regular armies. Could you envisage this in our country?

Stoltenberg: I do not see any alternative to an army in which the proportion of long-term servicemen and career soldiers in the total troop strength will undoubtedly increase, in which the reservists will take over a considerably more important role, but in which compulsory military service remains unrenounceable.

SZ: Why?

Stoltenberg: Compulsory military service is the product of democracy, as Theodor Heuss put it. Moreover, we could not reach the required personnel strength in another way, not even if the Bundeswehr could be significantly reduced in the course of developments in the nineties in connection with disarmament negotiations.

SZ: As a result of the declining demographic curve, the economy is entering into competition with you.

Stoltenberg: In addition to decreasing age-groups, increased competition concerning the recruiting of young people is a real problem. In the past 13 months alone, the number of people who have taken up employment has increased by more than 300,000. Therefore, the attraction program which has now been resolved is the minimum of what we need. However, I have also ascertained that an increasing number of entrepreneurs prefer to employ young people who have stood the test as long-term servicemen or draftees in the Bundeswehr and, above all, acquired qualifications there.

SZ: If democracies do not want to have much to do with their armies, if the feeling of threat decreases in general, why should the Army not be reduced and permitted to withdraw from society, so to speak?

Stoltenberg: This would be a disastrous development.

SZ: Why?

Stoltenberg: Because this could again cause situations such as those we experienced in former stages of German history. The Bundeswehr must remain rooted in our people.

#### **CSCE States Conference on Military Doctrines Meets in FRG**

AU2706093989 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND  
in German 26 Jun 89 p 5

[ADN report: "International Conference on Military Doctrines in FRG"]

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—A several-day international seminar at the Research Institute for International Politics and Security in Ebenhausen (Bavaria FRG), which was concluded on the weekend [24-25 June], focused on security concepts, military strategies, and NATO and Warsaw Pact military doctrines. Fifty-five politicians, officers, and scientists from CSCE states, among them Vladimir Lobov, chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact United Armed Forces, heads, and deputy heads of delegations to the Vienna negotiations, compared the military doctrines of the two alliances.

The GDR was represented by Prof Max Schmidt, director of the International Politics and Economics Institute, and Prof Wilhelm Nordin, a retired vice admiral. Notwithstanding different and sometimes contrary points of view on many questions, there was agreement that the present international situation makes it necessary to aim the military doctrines and armed forces exclusively at preventing war.

The participants in the conference agreed with Prof Schmidt's proposal to attach more importance to studying military doctrines in scientific work, and to discussing them as part of a process during the Vienna negotiations on confidence-building measures.

FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher stressed that the seminar has blazed the trail for dialogue on military doctrines in the next years. The exchange of ideas between diplomats, officers, and scientists could play a stimulating role in the further negotiations in Vienna.

**FRG Called 'Open Door' in Global Arms Exports**  
36200189z Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German  
12 Jun 89 pp 70-86

[Unattributed article: "'We Simply Have an Open Door,' SPIEGEL Report on the Federal Office for Trade and Industry—West Germany's Most Unusual Government Agency"; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Weapons exports to problem areas, illicit sales of nuclear materials to the Third World, chemical plants for Al-Qadhdhafi—scarcely an export affair in which the BAW [Federal Office for Trade and Industry] in Eschborn is not involved. At the "agency of tears," as government officials themselves refer to it ironically, trouble is brewing as nowhere else. Now the state prosecutor is also taking an interest in the scandal-ridden agency: In mid-May the home of a former director of the agency was searched.

The management at Gildemeister AG appeared extremely surprised. In March, state attorneys and customs inspectors marched into the offices of this machine tool manufacturing facility in Bielefeld, read files, and thumbed through accounting receipts. But the gentlemen on the management floor did not really understand what it was all about.

The reason for the search, one manager angrily reported later to a business associate, was an export deal that had been concluded in close cooperation with the experts at the BAW in Eschborn. "They discussed all of it with us," said the man from Gildemeister indignantly.

The investigators were interested in the so-called Saad 16 project—a technology center being erected near the Iraqi city of Mosul, at which medium-range missiles and chemical weapons were to be developed, according to intelligence information. This complex, equipped with electronics workshops, wind tunnels, and an underground firing range, was considered one of Iraq's most ambitious armaments projects. A dozen West German firms are on the list of suppliers, lead by the Gildemeister subsidiary Projecta and the armaments producer Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB).

Two days after Whitsuntide, state attorneys were at the home of now retired BAW employee Guenter Welzien, 67. The investigators had obtained a search warrant for the home of this retired government director who was involved in the Gildemeister business before his retirement. At Welzien's home they were looking for any papers he might have saved that would provide information on how cooperation between government officials and the companies requesting permits had resulted in permits for the business in Iraq.

The companies involved certainly did not have to pursue any forbidden avenues of export in order to implement the Iraqi missile program. For testing stations and control systems they were able for the most part to show

official whitewash certificates—the BAW supervisors in Eschborn had evaluated the shipments individually and found them permissible while closing their eyes to the overall project.

The state attorneys in Bielefeld have doubts as to "whether that was quite right." Informed sources say that those involved at the BAW advised arms exporters on how to circumvent export bans—for a fee whenever possible. Western intelligence services have long been spreading the word that individual officials were "not reliable."

What is certain is that the BAW, in a so-called clearance certificate "for submission to customs officials," assured Gildemeister's Projecta that "mechanical and electrical equipment, and control, measurement, and testing devices for a research, development, and training institute with eight main divisions, identified as the Saad 16 project, require no export permit according to current regulations."

On 9 April, only after the affair had become public (DER SPIEGEL 13/1989), the agency conceded and withdrew the whitewash certificates for Gildemeister. At the time, the state attorneys were already looking through the 500 confiscated binders full of evidence.

The West German Government was severely discredited among its allies: In an international agreement in 1987 Bonn had agreed not to provide sensitive support technology to third countries. Consequently, the missile deal should not have been permitted under any circumstances.

Saad 16 is no isolated case and BAW's man under scrutiny, Welzien, is no isolated figure: Officials in Eschborn have been involved over and over, whenever Bonn has ended up in the whirlpool of international scandal.

Whether it was the submarine blueprints deal with South Africa, the numerous nuclear exports to Pakistan, or the current missile deal with Iraq—it has always been these same export supervisors in Eschborn who were extremely liberal in their interpretation of export regulations.

They have preferred to let an occasional foreign policy time bomb slip through than deny a West German firm export rights. Officials in Eschborn, with such an agency policy, have found themselves in silent complicity with their superiors in Bonn's Ministry of Economics: What it was possible to export was not to be stopped unnecessarily by the agency.

So it happened—nuclear weapons ban notwithstanding—that tons of heavy water from nuclear materials dealer Alfred Hempel of Duesseldorf, and 95 kilograms of beryllium from the Hanau firm Degussa went to India, which is working on the hydrogen bomb. India's arch-foe

Pakistan, on the other hand, received valves, vacuum pumps, and brazing furnaces for its nuclear program from the West German firm Leybold Heraeus, and allegedly ordered testing equipment for missile development from Aviatest in Duesseldorf.

Special computers from armaments producer MBB went to Argentina for missile guidance systems; a control system from Siemens AG ended up in Libya; special machine tools for submarine construction from Japan's Toshiba, which were assembled in West Germany, were obtained by the Soviet Union—all, some via export permit, some via clearance certificate, were approved by the agency in Eschborn.

If large export orders caused problems with export permits, insiders report that BAW experts were known to suggest the so-called splitting procedure: The orders were divided up into individual shipments and therefore could be considered legal—close your eyes and let them through.

Whenever possible, this was also the case with Gilde-meister. The state attorneys in Bielefeld are currently researching whether officials were aware of the magnitude of the total order. Therefore, they have also asked several other BAW employees to appear for questioning in addition to Welzien.

Diplomatic dispatches and protests from Washington, London, and Paris have long been stacking up at the Foreign Ministry. Among the allies, West Germany is suspected of having violated the spirit and the letter of the nuclear weapons ban and—using Al-Qadhdhafi's poison gas as an example—of being prepared to walk over corpses in order to achieve a trade balance.

"We simply have an open door," is how Hermann Bachmaier (SPD) [Social Democratic Party of Germany], chairman of the Nuclear Research Committee in Bonn, described the supervisory practices in the "agency of tears," as it is ironically referred to within the government itself. "Free rein for deal makers," is the slogan of the agency in Eschborn, says Maria Luise Teubner, Greens party Bundestag deputy.

The agency, which is in fact the central government office for export supervision, is considered by many diplomats in the Foreign Ministry simply a "pigsty." It has also long been at odds with other supervisory agencies. Customs investigators, state attorneys, and intelligence officers have the same complaint—that the Eschborn agency is "purely an institute for promoting exports" and frequently hinders investigations of companies.

The civil servants in Eschborn, when confronted with such accusations, just shrug their shoulders. "We have no room whatsoever for latitude," maintains BAW spokesman Norbert Goworr, 33. He says that the agency adheres strictly to Bonn's export regulations and to "policy stipulations."

The wish of the politicians—regardless of party affiliation—has always been "the quickest and smoothest possible handling" of West German exports, says Lorenz Schomerus, 55, department head for foreign economic policy at the Federal Economics Ministry (BMW) of Helmut Haussmann (FDP) [Free Democratic Party]. According to Schomerus, "There was no interest in strict controls."

West German exporters must have actually felt as if they had grown wings when the agency was created 35 years ago on Bockenheimer Landstrasse in Frankfurt. While previously foreign trade had been strictly regulated by the decrees of the occupation forces, Bonn completely revamped the procedure with the Foreign Trade Act of 1961. From then on, essentially any export from West Germany was permitted. Any restrictions, according to the text of the law, were "to be stated such that freedom of economic activity is interfered with as little as possible."

BAW president Hans Rummer, 58, also drummed this principle into his new employees. This honorary professor (who has a law degree) at the Pforzheim Vocational School, and who, as the gossips say, prefers teaching "import-export restrictions" to his students to demanding similar behavior from his employees, likes to refer again and again to the name of his agency: "Federal Office for Trade and Industry"—not against.

The agency which Rummer has headed for 14 years is structured accordingly. A large number of the approximately 500 employees, who moved from Frankfurt in 1975 to a 14-story administrative building in Eschborn, are basically concerned with the distribution of subsidies—from coal subsidies to film subsidies. Supervision of the more than 15 million annual export transactions, on the other hand, has traditionally been understaffed.

Only 16 officials work under Hans-Peter Niepold, 44, the section head for foreign trade supervision. Another 63 employees are involved in investigating and issuing more than 70,000 export permits each year, as well as drawing up more than 23,000 international import certificates and, if the article to be exported is not an embargoed item in their view, giving the "all clear" informally or via clearance certificates to export freely—in official jargon: "rubber-stamping."

Insiders describe working conditions within the agency as medieval—making copies of transactions involves going long distances, the EDV [electronic data processing] system is "an improved note pad" and the filing system is "from the days of Bismarck."

An export permit is stamped up to 20 times before it leaves the building. However, the number of stamps does not verify the quality of the review—on the contrary: "The constant shifting back and forth of requests," reports one BAW man, lead to "the inability to locate" a



particular request. "This constant searching," takes up, "conservatively estimated, 20 percent of the working time" of the review personnel.

Which export goods require permits is determined by Bonn's export list. This listing is based on the so-called Cocom list—named for the Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy agreed to by 16 Western nations 38 years ago in order to prevent sensitive Western technology from getting to the Eastern Bloc.

Translation problems are not excluded: For three years, special computers suitable for weapons and missile programs were able to leave West Germany without permits because the English word "any" had been mistranslated. Only those computers were thought to require permits which fulfilled all of the conditions stated in the list and not, as intended by the Cocom authors, any one of the conditions.

When the Cocom list is updated every year at the U.S. Embassy in Paris, BAW officials are usually present on the German side: Because the highly compensated ministry officials are not familiar with the technical details, they are advised during the meetings by the senior executive officers from Eschborn.

On the other hand, they do not feel that they are on firm ground either. Therefore, they are happy to obtain advice from companies. Now and then the Biedermanns at the BAW direct their inquiries directly to the arsonists.

For example, when in Paris in 1987 the discussions centered on "deuterized compounds" (heavy water), the agency in Eschborn turned to Duesseldorf's Alfred Hempel AG, of all places. The already well known heavy water dealer was expected to provide tips on what, whenever practicable, could be kept off the embargo list.

At Bonn's instructions, individual BAW employees spend up to 80 working days per year at international conferences in Paris, Vienna, or elsewhere. In the meantime, the work piles up at home. Precisely two and a half staff positions in Eschborn are devoted to reviewing the approximately 120,000 reports per year regarding the import and export of radioactive substances such as cobalt 60 and tritium—they must dispose of 26 cases per hour.

A quick glance at the paper is all that is possible. Necessary information is also frequently lacking. For example: In order to evaluate the reports, the BAW would have to know what amounts of radioactive substances the respective firms are even allowed to have. This information can be found in the so-called handling permits issued in accordance with the Radiation Protection Ordinance, but the agency usually does not have them available.

"It is very possible," confirms a BAW employee, that commercial lots of tritium, the gas so useful for making bombs, are sent back and forth in amounts for which the

respective companies do not even have handling permits. It apparently did not occur to the officials that this was a serious lack of supervision until after a conversation with the editors of DER SPIEGEL: Three weeks later they requested in memos to their respective clients that each send the agency copies of "your handling permit."

As long as such information is not available, all the doors are left wide open for abuse, as Manfred Ruck, 47, BAW section head for chemistry and radioactive substances had to admit to the Nuclear Investigative Committee in Bonn.

When Ruck's people, after the fact, checked over long-since completed exports of radioactive materials sometime last year, "many, many" irregularities were discovered. Ruck: "If these substances end up in the wrong hands, this is a serious violation."

The "small exotic area" (according to Rummer) of nuclear fuels, included among the goods requiring permits in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act, is so hopelessly understaffed that, also according to Ruck, "there is not time for proper processing by the staff."

What slips through the agency is also not held up by customs. "An inspection of the goods can hardly take place" at the border, as Juergen Rump, 45, section head responsible for foreign trade controls at the ZKI [Customs Criminal Activities Institute] in Cologne reported to the committee in Bonn. "Customs controls" are handled, he said, "strictly on paper."

According to standing instructions, shipments containing radioactive substances are "to be processed as quickly as possible." He could "not recall," said Rump, that West German customs "was ever aware" of an illegal nuclear export.

No wonder: Customs officials, too, are more interested in protecting the West German economy against undesirable cheap imports than in tracking down the black sheep among exports. Of the approximately 800 customs officials who patrol Hamburg harbor every day, only about 30 perform a random check of the papers accompanying export goods. At the same time, the 770 import inspectors check over the containers and shipping crates containing imported goods "in fine detail," reports Karlheinz Schmidt of the Hamburg Regional Finance Directorate.

If an item for export is actually held up, someone from the "agency in charge" (Schmidt's words) must hurry right over: one of those totally overworked fellows from the BAW. The Eschborn agency alone decides, based on the export list, what requires permits and what does not.

Therefore, a clearance certificate (called an "NB" in official jargon) from Eschborn works like an open sesame at the border crossing gate: No one dares to contradict the BAW's interpretation.



In accordance with agency head Rummer's motto that every company has "a right to expect that a request for an export permit from the BAW will not be checked so thoroughly that the contract is lost," a "self-pickup service" was initiated "for urgent cases": The coveted "okay certificates" can be picked up only a few hours after the request is submitted.

Sometimes requested information or instructions from the Economics Ministry are not taken into account during the standard paper reviews—even though top BAW officials, as Rummer emphasizes, "come together in person several times a week" to coordinate with their colleagues at headquarters in Bonn.

In 1987, for example, officials "rubber-stamped," i.e., no permit required, the export of three ultrasound testing devices from the scandal-ridden firm of Nukem in Hanau, which were intended for testing fuel element casing tubes in South Africa—even though, by order of the Economics Ministry, Bonn was to be informed of everything that went to that racist nation.

When the state attorneys last December became interested in exports to South Africa, the ministry first had to make inquiries in Eschborn. Another export permit for an additional testing system, issued in May 1988 also for South Africa, came promptly to light.

Only after the fact did Bonn also find out that in 1986, in an urgent processing action at the BAW, specialized American computers had slipped through to Pakistan which were suitable for "controlling weapons systems," as experts in Bonn's Research Ministry discovered following protests by the Americans.

During the subsequent review, the experts found out what their colleagues at the BAW had overlooked in the rush: The stated use could not have been correct; the devices were supposed to be used in Pakistan for payroll accounting—"a special application," say Research Ministry officials, for which the computers supplied were not at all suitable.

That "problems with permits" have occurred again and again is freely admitted by section head Schomerus. Because they were so "loaded down with harmless requests," the people in Eschborn could not adequately follow up on "the more suspicious cases." Schomerus: "we had known exactly what some of this was for—perhaps we would have decided differently."

Frequently the officials did indeed know exactly for what purpose forging presses were going to Iraq and special milling machines to Pakistan, for example. These types of things were nevertheless classified as not requiring permits because, as section head Hans-Juergen Spies of the Economics Ministry maintains, the criterion of how such goods would be used was "irrelevant."

Sometimes, however, the agency has taken an interest in the stated use after all: When it was in the interest of a given requestor. That is what happened with Rudolph Maximilian Ortmer, 52, one-time manager of Neue Technologien GmbH (NTG) of Gelnhausen, whom the state attorneys in Hanau, Albert Farwick and Reinhard Huebner, suspect of violating the Military Weapons Control Act.

Four years ago, when Ortmer wanted to sell a so-called heavy water cleaning system to Pakistan, Economics Ministry officials in Bonn found a "legal situation clearly favoring NTG," based specifically on the alleged intended use (according to Spies, "environmental protection, radiation protection"). A representative of the Foreign Office angrily noted that the economics department in other cases always considers the "subjective intended use" to be "irrelevant."

The diplomats got wind of it because Ortmer had "unfortunately" (according to the BAW) explained in writing the procedure for extracting tritium—the substance used in bombs—from heavy water. Because "even small amounts of tritium," according to Foreign Office officials, were sufficient "to set off a fission bomb," they urged a restrictive attitude.

At this point in time, however, section head Spies of the Economics Ministry and BAW man Ruck had long been having "in-depth discussions" (according to Huebner) with the NTG manager; a visit to Ortmer over sherry and numerous telephone calls to him fostered this contact. Ultimately, Ortmer even received a copy of the draft of an internal letter. Later on, the BAW also evaluated the system entirely from Ortmer's viewpoint: The system was rather harmless—equivalent "to a drinking water purification system."

In the meantime, the strange behavior of the officials at the Economics Ministry is also a matter of interest to the state attorney.

However, prosecutor Huebner told the nuclear committee in Bonn that he does not see a need to "initiate a preliminary investigation of the officials at this time." But because the telephone conversations surreptitiously tape-recorded by Ortmer could be of "some help" to the NTG manager, he wants at least to "listen to them as evidence." This is because the agency, when asked by Huebner in writing whether they had any information on NTG, answered that they did not know this firm.

Based on a letter written in May of this year, retired BAW man Welzien, in whom the state attorneys in Bielefeld are currently taking a particular interest, does indeed "remember very well" a "visit from Mr Ortmer at the BAW." In a letter to one of the accused in the NTG affair offering his services as an advisor, the retired government director said he had been "involved in these cases" during his tenure and "as co-author and contributor to the German export list" was also familiar.

"naturally, with the details" of that questionable section which the NTG business allegedly violated.

Welzien's letter is accompanied by a business card listing everything in which he feels competent, from nuclear engineering to "weapons and ammunition." Welzien also proclaims energetically that he would "gladly visit" the addressee should there be "any interest"—and, finally, this active retiree, who requested "confidential treatment" of his letter, claims that he is "still on the ball."

That appears, in fact, to be the case. As recently as last summer Welzien provided "tutoring" in export law to managers at Industrierwerke Karlsruhe Augsburg (IWKA), for a fee, as he himself admits. The purpose of the meeting, recalls one participant, was to obtain a clearance certificate for a thorny export order: Schaefer Werkzeugmaschinen GmbH, a subsidiary of IWKA, wanted to deliver 15 lathes to Iraq. The intended buyer: Saad Baghdad, an organization under the supervision of the directorate for military products.

Welzien, again concerned with confidentiality, introduced himself at the meeting with the following words: "You can see me but I am not here." Then, however, he is said to have lectured simply as "an honest broker" on "the use" of the export list, and is said not to have discussed "any specific business."

According to a draft of the contract, the business was initially referred to as the sale of machines for making precision "parts for 155-mm grenades." Soon, however, only the manufacture of "out-of-round parts" was mentioned. The cosmetic linguistic change took place prior to Welzien's visit, however.

Norbert Gansel (SPD), deputy to the Bundestag and member of the submarine committee, maintains, however, that retiree Welzien provided the defense in the Kiel submarine affair with assistance regarding phrasing. Welzien is also no stranger to the legal proceedings against two former managers from Leybold Heraeus, who are accused of illegally supplying parts for a uranium centrifuge for Pakistan's bomb program—"very thoughtful" is what one defense attorney called him for his appearance as an "expert consultant." Welzien is likely also striving for the same result in the criminal proceedings regarding the Gelnhausen tritium deal.

The heavy water cleaning system from NTG was not delivered during his tenure—the Pakistanis found it too expensive. Instead, one year later, the company delivered a much more dangerous device: a system for extracting and storing 60 grams of pure tritium (DER SPIEGEL 8/1989).

This system is intended "specifically for nuclear weapons production," report state attorneys in an internal report. The deal could have been prevented, it has recently been shown, if the officials had followed up on concrete information from the U.S. Embassy in Bonn.

On 13 March 1986, a U.S. diplomat at the Foreign Office had provided an intelligence tip called a "nonpaper." According to this "nonpaper," a German firm wanted to export "a tritium extraction system" to Pakistan. The reaction of the Economics Ministry which received the report that same day: The Foreign Office was requested to please not use the "misleading term tritium extraction system."

"Under no circumstances," said the Economics Ministry, should NTG be mentioned to the Americans. Shortly before, Ortmayr had "expressly" requested in a telephone conversation that "the company be left out of any public discussion."

The Americans quickly found out on their own which company wanted to export the system. On 1 December 1986, they reported in concrete terms that "the German firm NTG" had made the Atomic Agency in Pakistan an offer "for installation of a tritium extraction system."

The Americans urgently requested that Bonn "take all possible steps" to ensure that such an export be prevented at all cost "until our two governments have an opportunity to discuss it."

Once again the Eschborn officials took little action—not so NTG: On 30 December one part of the so-called tritium treatment system headed for Pakistan by ship and a few days later the other part left as air freight.

The non-inspectors in Bonn and Eschborn very likely could have prevented many an inflammatory shipment to authoritarian regimes, areas of tension, or countries on the brink of nuclear capability—in many cases they were informed sufficiently early.

In July 1985, for example, the BAW and the Economics Ministry were aware of a report from the Soviet Embassy in Bonn concerning unusual activities on the part of Imhausen Chemie in Lahr in Baden-Wuerttemberg, in which the destinations Hong Kong and Libya are mentioned in addition to "a state-owned German company" (meaning Salzgitter AG)—critical keywords in the Rabita scandal.

However, the agency did not find the company in its files. And no one in Bonn or Eschborn thought to inform an investigative agency. So nothing happened at all.

"We are not a federal ministry for criminal investigation," protests ministry director Schomerus. A supervisory agency can not assume investigative tasks at the same time, he said. And even if it could: At the BAW—and this is where the agency's narrow-mindedness is becoming a lasting political scandal—there is obviously no inclination whatsoever to call in criminal investigators. In nearly all of the serious export cases, such as Rabita, Saad 16, or NTG, criminal investigations have been the result of revelations by the press, tips from third

parties, or information from tax investigators, not of any action by the BAW or the Economics Ministry.

The economics officials want to have so little to do with the state attorneys that they had a legal expert opinion prepared to clarify basic principles when they became aware of the Howaldt shipyard blueprint deal in Kiel in 1985. Their problem: "If members of the Ministry of Economics, in their official capacity, become aware of matters where violation of the penal provisions of the Military Weapons Control Act is suspected, the question is whether an obligation exists to inform the relevant state attorney's office of the matter."

The agency's internal answer sounds like something from Radio Yerevan: There is "no general obligation" on the part of agencies "to file charges regarding criminal acts" as long as no "special legal ruling" exists. The Military Weapons Control Act recognizes "no special obligation to file charges." Therefore, "the decision in this regard is up to the discretion of the head of the agency," according to the in-house expert opinion. Charges were not filed.

The agency reacted with absolutely hair-raising inaction to information from the Americans who have intervened in the Pakistan case for more than 10 years now. As early as 1979, then-president Jimmy Carter expressed concern to his contemporary, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. In 1987, former U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz also demanded in the strongest terms that his German counterpart Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) "consider additional steps" for "preventing the spread of nuclear weapons." In dozens of cases, concrete information from the United States has landed on the desks of officials in Bonn.

"The demarches," said Richard Perle, former undersecretary at the U.S. Defense Department, sarcastically at the end of April, were likely viewed in Bonn as "demarch-mallows"; the German Government "does not hear what we are saying."

Inquiries urged by the United States were again and again rejected by officials with the statement that the firms involved could "view this as unjustified interference with their business policy." And besides, there was no time for them. "I reject such work-creating measures in principle," says department head Spies. His BAW colleague, Welzien, also noted on internal correspondence that the tips from the United States "normally land in my waste basket."

The current practice—doubtful for the economy—is not likely to change much in the future.

The West German Government did quickly pass amendments to foreign trade and military weapons control legislation after pressure from abroad increased as a result of Rabita and the tritium deal by NTG. But critics such as Gansel of the SPD consider the clauses, which

will undergo a first reading in the Bundestag next week, to be a "bureaucratic reflex action" which "only increases red tape and not the actual controls in individual cases."

The "structural deficit in terms of enforcement" (according to Gansel) will also not be alleviated by establishing 170 additional positions and 3 new sub-departments at the BAW. As SPD politician Bachmaier also said sarcastically, "This is like hunting vultures with a butterfly net."

According to previously existing law, exporters could ship plans and manufacturing documents for the construction of chemical plants—even factories capable of producing poison gas weapons—over the border with impunity. Even the export of an associated control system required no permit—which is why it is questionable whether it can be proved that the head of Imhausen, Juergen Hippenstiel, arrested in May, committed a crime.

Startled by the scandal over Al-Qadhdhafi's poison gas factory, the government this spring formulated an executive order applying specifically to Rabita: Be it toilet seats, refrigerators or louver windows, according to the new law resulting from the Libya affair, everything destined for Rabita now requires a specific permit. Bonn, however, was unwilling to allow further application of this principle, which corresponds to American export law.

In the future, a general West German production ban on A, B, and C weapons in accordance with the Military Weapons Control Act will be in place; special permits, as were possible earlier, will be prohibited. "Support" for the production of such military equipment abroad by "supplying installation items," plans, and know-how, or by providing assembly work on site will also be liable to prosecution. In the case of violations, not only the company's owners but also the engineers will be held accountable.

The "act of support," however, is very narrowly defined in the draft law. Only "cases of negligence" will incur penalties. This means that a supplier, despite concrete indications that his product is being misused, believes all of the assurances to the contrary—something that is very difficult to prove.

The formulation of the law presents a basic problem. The difficulty with all attempts to limit the production of chemical weapons is that, as Schomerus says, "from a certain point on, all plants that produce antibiotics can also produce biological weapons." However, he also says, no one could "seriously believe that health care must no longer be provided in Iraq."

Therefore, the stipulations regarding so-called dual-use items, which have civilian as well as military uses,

remain a loophole—particularly for exporting certain machine tools, testing equipment, and fittings.

The most interesting new development in the complicated conglomerate of ordinances and legal remedies, which do after all provide for substantially larger penalties, involves regulations regarding "expanded data exchanges" between government agencies. In the future, information from the different departments, from the BAW to the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (BKA), from the Customs Administration to the Customs Criminal Activities Institute (ZKI), will be available in an electronic network. "We will," promises Schomerus, "produce something very fine, operatively speaking, in the next few years."

Critics believe, however, that the planned "computer profile system" (quote from Schomerus) is not entirely without problems in terms of data protection laws. The BKA, which does not want the information exchange to be a one-way street, is demanding in turn that it have access to the BAW's information—unblemished firms could therefore end up in the police computer for no apparent reason.

Above all, however, increased exchanges of data and stricter laws will not do much good as long as BAW officials and their superiors in the Economics Ministry in Bonn are solely responsible for deciding what requires a permit and what does not. No court will declare an export illegal which the BAW has "rubber-stamped," i.e., found exempt from export permit requirements.

When the Regional Finance Directorate (OFD) in Kiel in 1987 had to check out "suspicion of unauthorized export of submarine manufacturing systems to the Republic of South Africa," for example, there was a huge political scandal. However, the criminal investigation was quickly halted—as usual the BAW was able to find no violation of the export list.

At the request of the OFD, the experts in Eschborn promptly got to work. First they asked if it would be possible to "inspect a submarine" in Kiel. The requested expert opinion, they admitted to their colleagues in Kiel, would be, so to speak, "a pioneering effort"—they had "not yet had any experience with submarines in this form."

Several months after the inspection of the submarine, the BAW officials were so well informed that they were able to maintain forcefully that "only an experienced submarine manufacturer" would be able to make any use of the documents which by that time had been spirited out of West Germany under strict secrecy in diplomatic pouches. And besides, the blueprints were not particularly suited to military purposes—"basically" they corresponded to design drawings for a "civilian submarine not requiring an export permit."

From this information, their colleagues at the OFD in Kiel concluded that at most "a kind of cigar could be assembled" which just happened to be "waterproof"—a Havana deluxe, so to speak. At any rate, the regime in South Africa paid 45 million marks for the documents.



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